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ABSTRACT
In the recurring and contentious debates regarding the President’s authority to declare (and perhaps rescind)
National Monuments, both those who argue for an expansive authority and those who favor restricted authority
treat the Antiquities Act as a delegation of legislative power; they only disagree on whether the delegation is
appropriate or, in the case of rescission, whether a delegation exists at all. However, this framework is wrong.
The Property Clause is not strictly a legislative power. Rather, it is a hybrid; rulemaking power is interspersed
with an administrative one—the power to manage property. The Supreme Court has recognized this distinction
in the past, including in a case decided the same year Congress passed the Antiquities Act.
The distinction makes a difference because when Congress enlists the Executive in the management of public lands,
as it did with the Antiquities Act, it is not delegating legislative power; rather, it is sharing its plenary powers of
proprietorship. The principle that underlies the non-delegation doctrine—separation of powers—is not applicable
when Congress delegates a non-legislative power. This has implications for the proper method of recourse for
inappropriate presidential action made pursuant to delegated Property Clause power. Whereas recourse for an
improper delegation of legislative authority lies with the courts, recourse for alleged inappropriate executive action
under a delegated proprietor power lies with the entity that enlisted the Executive as its property manager in the first
place—Congress. Indeed, Congress has often stepped in to correct presidential mismanagement of public lands,
including the management of National Monuments. At other times, Congress has acquiesced in presidential action,
a practice the Court has previously accepted as evidence of the constitutionality and legality of presidential action.
Courts have systematically refused to second-guess presidential actions pursued under the Property Clause,
including the creation of National Monuments, even when those monuments arguably exceed the “smallest area
compatible” with the protection and care of the objects to be protected as delineated in the statute. Courts should
also refuse to second-guess the President’s decision to reduce National Monuments, leaving to Congress the
important work of correcting the President’s missteps, as it has done in the past. Let Congress guard its own
authority over land management.
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INTRODUCTION
A relatively obscure and seemingly benign piece of legislation enacted
over 100 years ago is the source, every twenty years or so, of intense
controversy in the American West. The Antiquities Act of 1906 grants the
President power to withdraw federal land from the public domain, restricting
commercial activities thereon, such as mining and grazing. The President
does so by proclaiming a designated area of federal land to be a National
Monument. Although the original purpose of the Act was to protect ancient
artifacts from raiding, almost all presidents who have exercised power
thereunder have adopted a very expansive view of their authority, often
declaring millions of acres of the public domain to be National Monuments,
rendering them “National Park Lites,” generally off limits to potentially
profitable resource extraction activities.1
The Antiquities Act has been divisive since its inception. Through this
Act, Congress delegated its constitutional power to “make all needful rules
and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the
United States” to the President.2 Included within that delegation was
discretion to determine the location and, more importantly, the size of
National Monuments. In the exercise of this authority, the President is not
required to consult with anyone—not Congress, not inferior executive
branch departments, not the States, not the Tribes, and not the private
sector. The President is not required to give advanced public notice or solicit
public comments. The President is not required to conduct any
environmental assessments (as the Department of Interior must do when
considering whether to designate some public lands as wilderness.)3 Franklin
Roosevelt created a National Monument in Wyoming in a semi-secretive
process that caused one upset Senator to compare his action to the Japanese
sneak attack on Pearl Harbor.4 Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton established
monuments in Alaska and Utah, respectively, for which they were both hung
in effigy.5

1

2
3
4
5

Antiquities Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-209, 34 Stat. 225 (codified as amended at 54 U.S.C.
§ 320301 (2012)).
Historically, already-existing mining and grazing claims have been
grandfathered into National Monuments.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
See 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2012) (requiring “detailed statements” from federal officials about the
environmental consequences of proposed decisions).
Hal Rothman, Showdown at Jackson Hole, in THE ANTIQUITIES ACT 83 (David Harmon, Francis P.
McManamon & Dwight T. Pitcaithley eds., 2006).
See Lee Davidson, Grand Staircase, DESERET NEWS (Sept. 17, 2006, 12:00 AM),
https://www.deseretnews.com/article/645201833/Grand-Staircase.html; Timothy Egan, Alaska
Changes View on Carter After 20 Years, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2000), https://www.nytimes.com/
2000/08/25/us/alaska-changes-view-on-carter-after-20-years.html.
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The roots of National Monument controversies are procedural, not
substantive. Both proponents and opponents of large-scale monuments find
unilateral executive action distasteful. Indeed, the Framers of the
Constitution felt the same way. They rejected the idea of “Crown Lands”
and placed the power to manage property with Congress, not the Executive,
where management decisions would be subject to deliberation and
compromise.6 Congress has, however, enlisted the President as its property
manager and given him immense discretion in public lands management.
This delegated power is not legislative, but administrative. The concerns
that animate the non-delegation doctrine are not in play. Thus, there is
limited judicial review of presidential action pursuant to a delegated Property
Clause power. If Congress wants to rein in a runaway president, it may do
so, as it has done in the past. Indeed, past congressional action to modify the
presidential public lands power serves as a useful model for possible
amendments to the Antiquities Act.
Mark Twain is reputed to have said that although history does not repeat
itself, it often rhymes.7 In the waning days of his administration, President
Obama exercised delegated authority from Congress to designate several
new National Monuments and expand the borders of others.8 While some
of President Obama’s designations received bipartisan support, the largescale designations in the West, particularly the 1.35 million-acre Bears Ears
National Monument in southern Utah, ignited controversy, as anticipated.
Many western states’ leaders announced their opposition, stating that the
designation was federal overreach, and called upon incoming President
Trump to rescind the Bears Ears National Monument.9 Supporters
6
7
8

9

See Katherine S.H. Wyndham, Crown Land and Royal Patronage in Mid-Sixteenth Century England, 19 J.
BRIT. STUD. 18, 18–34 (1980) (explaining the crown lands and royal mischief resulting therefrom).
See Lawrence P. Wilkins, Symposium Foreword: Then, Now and into the Future: A Century of Legal Conflict
and Development, 28 IND. L. REV. 135, 137 n.4 (1995).
On December 28, 2016, President Obama created the Bears Ears National Monument in southern
Utah, consisting of 1.35 million acres, and the Gold Butte National Monument in Nevada,
consisting of 300,000 acres. On January 12, 2017, President Obama declared three new National
Monuments: the Birmingham Civil Rights National Historical Monument, the Freedom Riders
National Monument, and the Reconstruction Area National Monument, all consisting of less than
seventy acres. On that day, President Obama also enlarged the borders of the California Coastal
National Monument and the Cascade-Siskiyou National Monument in Oregon. See Juliet Eilperin
& Brady Dennis, With New Monuments in Nevada, Utah, Obama Adds to His Environmental Legacy, WASH.
POST (Dec. 28, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/with-newmonuments-in-nevada-utah-obama-adds-to-his-environmental-legacy/2016/12/28/e9833f62c471-11e6-8422-eac61c0ef74d_story.html?utm_term=.ed17ce6372ef; see also Juliet Eilperin &
Brady Dennis, Obama Names Five New National Monuments, Including Southern Civil Rights Sites, WASH.
POST (Jan. 12, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/obama-namesfive-new-national-monuments-including-southern-civil-rights-sites/2017/01/12/7f5ce78c-d90711e6-9a36-1d296534b31e_story.html?utm_term=.389d82a3fd46.
See, e.g., Brooks Hays, Governor of Utah Calls on Trump to Revoke Bears Ears National Monument, UNITED
PRESS INT’L (Feb. 5, 2017, 1:58 PM), https://www.upi.com/Governor-of-Utah-calls-on-Trump-
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countered that the designation was necessary to protect sacred Native
American sites, as well as the unique desert landscape.10
Upon taking office, President Trump issued an executive order
instructing the Department of the Interior to review any monument
designation since 1996 of at least 100,000 acres, and to make
recommendations regarding rescission or reduction.11 The parameters of the
directive allowed the Secretary to review the even more controversial Grand
Staircase-Escalante Monument, created in 1996.12 President Trump vowed
to “end these abuses and return control to the people.”13 Secretary of the
Interior Ryan Zinke began his review in April 2017 and, in June, he
recommended to President Trump that he significantly reduce the size of the
Bears Ears and Grand Staircase-Escalante Monuments and grant greater
control of the remainders to local Native American Tribes.14 On December
4, 2017, President Trump did exactly that, announcing significant reductions
to both Monuments.15 Immediately, the Navajo Nation and four other
American Indian tribes filed a lawsuit against Trump to undo his
reductions.16 Others followed: to date, there are at least five lawsuits seeking

10

11

12

13

14

15
16

to-revoke-Bears-Ears-National-Monument/4251486315351/.
See, e.g., Peggy Fletcher Stack, Supporters of Bears Ears, Grand Staircase Rally in Advance of Interior Secretary
Ryan Zinke’s Visit, SALT LAKE TRIB., (Mar. 8, 2017, 12:25 PM), https://www.sltrib.com/news/
environment/2017/05/08/supporters-of-bears-ears-grand-staircase-rally-in-advance-of-interiorsecretary-ryan-zinkes-visit/.
See Exec. Order No. 13,762, 82 Fed. Reg. 20,429 (Apr. 26, 2017) (“The Secretary . . . shall conduct
a review of all Presidential designations or expansions of designations under the Antiquities Act
made since January 1, 1996, where the designation covers more than 100,000 acres . . . .”). By
taking the review back to 1996, the Department of Interior can review all the monument
designations of Presidents Clinton and George W. Bush, including the even more controversial
Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument.
See James Brooke, New Reserve Stirs Animosities in Utah, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13, 1996),
https://www.nytimes.com/1996/10/13/us/new-reserve-stirs-animosities-in-utah.html
(discussing the creation of the Grand Staircase-Escalante Monument).
See Juliet Eilperin, Trump Orders Review of National Monuments, Vows to ‘End These Abuses and Return
Control to the People, WASH. POST (Apr. 26, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energyenvironment/wp/2017/04/25/zinke-to-review-large-national-monuments-created-since-1996to-make-sure-the-people-have-a-voice/?utm_term=.9e4fc74b49b1 (explaining the executive
order); Brooke Seipel, Interior Dept Recommends Reducing Bear Ears, Other Protected Land: Report, HILL
(Sept. 17, 2017, 10:33 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/351117-interiordept-recommends-reducing-bears-ears-other-protected-land (reporting that the Interior Secretary
recommended reducing the size of Grand Staircase-Escalante).
See Julie Turkewitz & Coral Davenport, Interior Secretary Recommends Shrinking Borders of Bears Ears
Monument, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/12/us/interiorsecretary-public-lands-utah-bears-ears.html (reporting on the Secretary’s recommendation).
See Proclamation No. 9681, 82 Fed. Reg. 58,081 (Dec. 4, 2017); Proclamation No. 9682, 82 Fed.
Reg. 58,089 (Dec. 4, 2017).
See Timothy Cama, Navajo Nation Sues Trump over Utah Monument Reduction, HILL (Dec. 5, 2017, 11:38
AM),
http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/363311-navajo-nation-sues-trump-overutah-monument-reduction (“The federal lawsuit . . . argues that Trump did not have the legal
authority to remove . . . protections that former President Barack Obama had established in 2016.”).
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to undo President Trump’s actions.17 And, true to history, these land
management arguments are taking place against background scenery that
consists of unauthorized grazing, protest “occupations” of public lands, and
federal arrests for the same.
Given the stakes involved, and especially given the intense controversy
generated by land management decisions in the West, it is natural to turn to
the courts to sort things out. That is what interested parties have done in the
past (with little success), and that is what interested parties are doing now.
But what is the appropriate role for a court in reviewing how the political
branches choose to manage the nation’s property? This Article makes two
related assertions: (1) the Property Clause is qualitatively different than
Congress’s other, legislative powers; and (2) this difference demands a very
limited judicial review of both congressional and presidential decisions
regarding public lands management. Essentially, the Constitution vests
Congress with the power to correct presidential missteps, such as those
alleged against President Trump.
This Article will demonstrate these twin ideas—(1) that there is and
ought to be judicial deference to the property-management decisions of the
political branches; and (2) that Congress is the appropriate entity to remedy
presidential abuses of power—find strong support in the history of public
lands management generally and the Antiquities Act in particular. Judges
have historically recognized their institutional comparative disadvantage to
set land policy or second-guess the political branches. Further, Congress has
both acquiesced to and remedied presidential actions in the past. Congress
has shown itself to be perfectly capable of putting a halt to presidential acts
that are an abuse of discretion, ultra vires, or unconstitutional.
Legal posturing over President Trump’s reduction of the monuments
began when he won the election, with public lands and constitutional law
scholars lining up on both sides. Mark Squillace, Eric Biber, Nicholas
Bryner, and Sean Hecht argue that the President lacks authority to reduce
or eliminate a national monument, based on the text of the Antiquities Act
and the legislative history of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act
(“FLPMA”) of 1976.18 They have circulated a letter in opposition to
17

18

In addition to the five tribes’ lawsuit against Trump, plaintiffs in other suits include the Natural
Resource Defense Council, the Wilderness Society, the Grand Staircase-Escalante Partners,
Patagonia Works, and Utah Dine Bikeyah. All lawsuits have been filed in the District of Columbia.
The Administration has asked the Court to transfer them to Utah. See Hopi Tribe v. Trump, No.
1:17-CV-02590-TSC (D.D.C. filed Dec. 4, 2017); Wilderness Society v. Trump, No. 1:17-CV02587-TSC (D.D.C. filed Dec. 4, 2017); Grand Staircase Escalante Partners v. Trump, No. 1:17CV-02591-TSC (D.D.C. filed Dec. 4, 2017); Utah Dine Bikeyah v. Trump, No. 1:17-CV-02605TSC (D.D.C. filed Dec. 6, 2017); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Trump, No. 1:17CV-02606-TSC (D.D.C. filed Dec. 7, 2017).
See Mark Squillace, Eric Biber, Nicholas Bryner & Sean Hecht, Presidents Lack Authority to Abolish or
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presidential rescission power that has received the support of 121 law
professors. On the other hand, a small but hardy number of legal academics
argue that the President has rescission authority, basing their argument also
on the text of the Antiquities Act, the history of its use, similar powers the
President enjoys in other areas of law, and constitutional theory.19 Todd
Gaziano and John Yoo make such an argument. Likewise, Richard Seamon
contends that the President may rescind monuments based on the Take Care
Clause, precedent, and constitutional theory.20
Both sides of the debate treat the Antiquities Act as a delegation of
legislative authority. For example, Squillace, Biber, Bryner, and Hecht state,
“Congress can . . . delegate [Property Clause] power to the President or
other members of the executive branch so long as it sets out an intelligible
principle to guide the exercise of executive discretion.”21 The “intelligible
principle” framework is a staple of non-delegation analysis for congressional
legislative powers. To wit, they cite two cases addressing the non-delegation
doctrine, both of which deal with congressional powers under Article I, not
Article IV, where the Property Clause resides.22 They treat the Property
Clause as yet another of Congress’s traditional legislative powers. Similarly,
in arguing that the President does have the authority to rescind a national
monument, Yoo and Gaziano point out that the Executive branch enjoys
rescission power for other Article I powers delegated to him. To demonstrate
what they call an “analogous” rescission power, Yoo and Gaziano discuss a
case in which the executive branch terminated a program established under
Congress’s Article I powers.23
This framework is wrong. A threshold question that these scholars, and
courts, need to ask is whether Congress, in the Antiquities Act, delegated a
legislative power, or . . . something else. This Article contends that Congress
delegated something else—its power to manage federal property. The
property management power is not a legislative power. This argument is
based on the history of the Property Clause, the purposes for which it exists,

19

20
21
22
23

Diminish National Monuments, 103 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 55, 63 (2017) (“The House Committee’s
Report on [FLPMA] makes clear that this provision was designed to prevent any unilateral
executive modification or revocation of national monuments.”). FLPMA eliminated all
presidential authority to unilaterally withdraw the public lands, except for authority under the
Antiquities Act.
See generally John Yoo & Todd Gaziano, Presidential Authority to Revoke or Reduce National
Monument
Designations
(2017),
https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/
Presidential-Authority-to-Revoke-or-Reduce-National-Monument-Designations.pdf.
Richard H. Seamon, Dismantling Monuments, 70 FLA. L. REV. 1, 31 (2018).
See Squillace, Biber, Bryner & Hecht, supra note 18, at 56.
See id. at 56 n.5 (citing Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 373 n.7 (1989); J.W. Hampton, Jr.
& Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)).
See Yoo & Gaziano, supra note 19, at 6–8 (citing Pennsylvania v. Lynn, 501 F.2d 848, 855–56 (D.C.
Cir. 1974)). Elsewhere, though, Yoo and Gaziano suggest that principles of trust law would be
appropriate for analyzing presidential powers under the Antiquities Act. Id. at 6.
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and its judicial interpretation both within and outside the Antiquities Act
context. Courts have repeatedly asserted the Property Clause power is not
strictly legislative.
A determination that public lands management is a different kind of
government power than legislation changes the landscape of executive power
exercised thereunder. Rather than viewing the executive branch as a quasilegislature exercising delegated legislative authority, subject to judicial
review, we should view the President as Congress’s property manager. The
President has all implied authority that is reasonably necessary to carry out
his express instructions. This framework means that the President has broad
discretionary power in the management of public lands, which discretion
may be clarified or overruled by Congress (as Congress has done several
times in the past).
More importantly, recourse for the alleged abuse of the President’s
management power lies primarily with Congress, not the courts. The
difference exists because a delegation of property management power does
not implicate the separation of powers the way that a delegation of legislative
power does. The sovereign people have standing to challenge in court a
delegation of legislative power to ensure that the three branches remain
separate, so that “[a]mbition [can] be made to counteract ambition” which
inures to the benefit of the people.24 When it comes to managing the
property of the United States, however, the concern regarding the separation
of powers does not exist. Congress may manage the federal property through
the enlistment of managers, including but not limited to the President,
without implicating the separation of powers. This is not a novel framework.
Past courts have repeatedly placed the burden on Congress to deal with
runaway presidents.
The point of this article is not to argue about whether Trump’s actions
were lawful or unlawful. Although I am inclined to think they were lawful
for reasons set forth in Part IV, even if he acted unlawfully, the proper
remedial institution is Congress, not the judiciary.
This Article will proceed as follows. Part I sets the background of the
present debate by tracing the history of (1) the Property Clause and (2) the
evolution of land policy in the nineteenth century. It helps explain why these
debates are so acrimonious. Part II explores the hybrid nature of the
Property Clause by examining its pre-constitutional history, its development
in the Convention, and its post-constitutional interpretation by both courts
and Congress. Part III explains how the nature of the Property Clause limits
judicial review. Part IV reviews the potential for judicial review of President
Trump’s actions, finding that judicial review for the Bears Ears reduction is

24

THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 290 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999).
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extremely limited. If the President violated the Antiquities Act, then it is the
duty of Congress, not the Courts, to correct him. Finally, given that Congress
is the best branch to remedy presidential action, Part V contains a proposed
amendment to the Antiquities Act that will fulfill its important goals while
defusing controversy.
I. WHAT’S THE FUSS?
The outgoing lame-duck President exercised authority delegated to him
from Congress under the Property Clause to set aside millions of acres of
western public lands as reserves. His “stroke of the pen” severely limited
natural resource extraction and grazing in those areas—a staple of local
economies. Western state politicians howled in opposition and accused
executive officials (“Theorists!”) of not understanding what life is like in the
American West. To them, the President was a tyrant, and the national
government had violated a core notion of federalism—that land use decisions
ought to be made locally. One livestock owner who continued to graze his
animals on federal land without permission was arrested by federal
authorities. The incoming President sought to allay the concerns of
westerners by promising to rescind his predecessor’s executive
proclamations, or at least reduce the size of the newly created reserves. The
major legal issue, though, was whether the President had the authority to
rescind a previous presidential proclamation creating land reserves. Some
argued such authority was inherent in the office of the President or was
implicitly contained within the initial delegation of power from Congress.
Others contended that the President could not exercise such power absent
an explicit delegation of rescission authority from Congress.
The scene depicted here comes, of course, from the year 1897.25 The
outgoing president was Grover Cleveland who designated thirteen new forest
reserves in western states just before leaving office. The incoming president
was William McKinley, who, though not opposed to the forest reserves per
se, wanted to build as much support as possible for a potential war with
Spain.26 He needed to be on the good side of representatives from western
states. The livestock owner was Pierre Grimaud, whose fight against the
federal government found its way to the Supreme Court.27 The pressing
legal issue was whether McKinley could simply rescind Cleveland’s orders.
25
26

27

See Robert Bassman, The 1897 Organic Act: A Historical Perspective, 7 NAT. RESOURCES L. 503, 509–
11 (1974) (describing the response to President Cleveland’s establishment of nature reserves).
During his administration, William McKinley proclaimed seven million acres of forest reserves. See
HAROLD K. STEEN, THE U.S. FOREST SERVICE: A HISTORY 34–36 (2004) (discussing the efforts
to pass the Pettigrew amendment to the 1897 appropriations bill despite opposition).
United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 514 (1911).
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Although the revocation of a presidential proclamation was not unheard of
in 1897, it was still rare, especially in light of the rarity of proclamations
themselves.28 McKinley hesitated to exercise such a power. Western state
delegates, however, demanded action in the form of the rescission of various
forest reserve designations. The impasse threatened McKinley’s agenda in
the first few days of his administration.
I will return to the history of the Forest Service Act of 1897 later to
discuss its comparative usefulness, or lack thereof, in interpreting the
Antiquities Act.29 The point here, though, is that debate over public lands
management in the United States is not new. Indeed, we may go much
further back in time in U.S. history to find instances of westerners angry at
the central government. The American Revolution began, in part, due to
colonial anger at the Crown’s attempts to prevent settlement west of the
Appalachian Mountains and to expand the borders of Québec into what
would become the Northwest Territory.30 In the Treaty of Paris, the British
ceded its large trans-Appalachian area to the United States—with the
Mississippi River becoming the western border of the new nation, and illdefined borders in the North and South.31 This large cession created
immediate administrative issues—who would govern the new land, and how?
These thorny political questions would present themselves time and time
again in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as the United States acquired
more territory. The issues continue into the present—not so much with
regard to federal territory outside the boundaries of the states, but to retained
28

29

30

31

The American Presidency Project keeps track of Presidential Proclamations from the founding until
the present. From 1789 until 1890, annual presidential proclamations numbered between zero and
five, with a few notable exceptions such as during the Civil War. In the year 2017, President Trump
issued 119 presidential proclamations, which is not inconsistent with his immediate predecessors in
office.
See Proclamations (Washington 1789-Trump 2018), AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT,
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/proclamations.php (last visited Dec. 19, 2018) (providing access
to every Presidential Proclamation). Grover Cleveland, whose forest reserve declarations were
under consideration for rescission by McKinley, had himself revoked a predecessor’s executive
order—that of Chester Arthur’s restoring to the public domain lands that had been held in trust
for various Indian Tribes.
See Proclamation No. 268 (Apr. 17, 1885), available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/205898 (“[T]he lands so proposed to be restored to the
public domain by said Executive order of February 27, 1885, are included as existing Indian
reservations . . . and that consequently, being treaty reservations, the Executive was without lawful
power to restore them to the public domain . . . .”).
Squillace, Biber, Bryner, and Hecht contend that the Forest Service Act, which grants an explicit
power of rescission to the President, demonstrates that the Antiquities Act, which contains no such
rescission power, is a one-way ratchet—a power to create monuments but not reduce or revoke
them. Squillace, Biber, Bryner & Hecht, supra note 18, at 58. For a discussion of why this analysis
of the Forest Service Act is wrong, see infra Part IV.
See, e.g., COLIN G. CALLOWAY, THE SCRATCH OF A PEN: 1763 AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF
NORTH AMERICA 97–99 (2006) (discussing colonists’ sense of entitlement to western lands and the
profitable opportunities there).
Treaty of Paris, U.K.-U.S., art. II, Sept. 3, 1783.
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federal lands within the states. Who governs the land, and how?
Contestations for the power to manage the public lands is the continuing
source of controversy to the present day.
Federal land policy has a long and interesting history, not all of which is
necessary to fleshing out the intricacies of the Antiquities Act.32 However, a

32

Scholarly interest in the history of the United States public lands grew in the early twentieth century
as President Theodore Roosevelt exercised extensive executive power to reserve public lands for
conservation efforts. Payson Jackson Treat, a historian at Stanford University, published The
National Land System, 1785–1820 in 1910, which was the first comprehensive examination of the
origins of federal land policy. PAYSON JACKSON TREAT, THE NATIONAL LAND SYSTEM, 1785–
1820, at v (1910) (introducing his study of the origins of the public domain in the United States and
the disposition of that land before 1820). Benjamin Hibbard took up the cause in 1926 and
extended the timeframe with the publication of his A History of Public Land Policies. There, Hibbard
described three periods of land policy: (1) one based on using public lands for revenue (1780s–
1841); (2) the public domain as a basis for national development (1841–1900); and (3) a period of
conservation (1900–1920). BENJAMIN HORACE HIBBARD, A HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND POLICIES
1, 136, 472 (1924) (separating the book’s discussion into three time periods). Vernon Parrington,
although not a western historian per se, spent the bulk of his career at the University of Washington
and memorably referred to the public lands disposition policy as “The Great Barbecue.” VERNON
PARRINGTON, 3 MAIN CURRENTS IN AMERICAN THOUGHT 23 (1930) (“Congress had rich gifts
to bestow—in lands, tariffs, subsidies, favors of all sorts; and when influential citizens made their
wishes known to the reigning statesmen, the sympathetic politicians were quick to turn the
government into the fairy godmother the voters wanted it to be. A huge barbecue was spread to
which all presumably were invited.”). In 1942, Roy Robbins published what he considered to be a
“synthesis on the history of public lands in the United States” encompassing questions of politics,
economics, law, and social history. ROY M. ROBBINS, OUR LANDED HERITAGE: THE PUBLIC
DOMAIN, 1776–1936, at vii (1942). Felix Cohen made sure to note that federal title to public lands
was obtained not only from European powers, but also from native tribes. See Felix S. Cohen,
Original Indian Title, 32 MINN. L. REV. 28, 35 (1947) (“Notwithstanding this prevailing mythology,
the historic fact is that practically all of the real estate acquired by the United States since 1776 was
purchased not from Napoleon or any other emperor or czar but from its original Indian owners.”).
In 1963, Vernon Carstensen edited a collection of historical essays on the public lands,
commissioned by the Bureau of Land Management to mark the sesquicentennial of the creation of
the General Land Office and the centennial of the Homestead Act (both anniversaries occurring
the previous year. See PUBLIC LANDS: STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
(Vernon Carstensen ed., 1963). The “dean” of Public Lands history, Paul W. Gates, published his
seminal work in 1968—History of Public Land Law Development—a government-financed project. This
work, incorporating the work of assistants and other historians, provides a long-range legal history
of public lands from the Founding to the 1960s. PAUL W. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW
DEVELOPMENT, at xi–xii (1968) (introducing the book with a discussion of Congress’s charge to
study public land law and the scholars who contributed to the work). Karen Merrill makes a
fascinating contribution to the history of public lands in Public Lands and Political Meaning: Ranchers,
the Government, and the Property Between Them. There, Merrill demonstrates that ranchers in the West
adopted a language of persuasion based in rights and the Constitution to assert an entitlement to
graze on public lands. They won a temporary victory with the Taylor Grazing Act but ultimately
lost the battle when Congress created the Bureau of Land Management. KAREN R. MERRILL,
PUBLIC LANDS AND POLITICAL MEANING: RANCHERS, THE GOVERNMENT, AND THE PROPERTY
BETWEEN THEM 173, 175–76 (2002) (discussing how the Taylor Grazing Act galvanized ranchers
to assert their rights and their frustration with the Bureau of Land Management’s regulation of
their affairs). For a series of essays on conflict involving public lands, see generally Colloquium,
Constitutional Conflicts on Public Lands, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 1101 (2004).
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basic knowledge of United States land policy, and especially how land
management structures changed in the late nineteenth century to involve the
executive branch to a much greater degree, is quite helpful to (1) understand
why public land management is so important to westerners, and (2)
contextualize the history of the Antiquities Act—both its passage and
subsequent interpretation. This brief review is meant to further those goals.
In doing so, we shall have a better grasp of the historical role of the judiciary
in overseeing the land management decisions of the political branches.
Congress established three important land policies during the 1780s,
prior to the adoption of the Constitution. First, the federal government
would manage unorganized territory. Many colonial charters had granted
tracts of land from “sea to sea” at a time when Anglo settlers and their
benefactors in England had no knowledge of the geography of North
America.33 The competing and overlapping claims to trans-Appalachian
land caused sharp divisions among the states. Those with competing claims
to the same land asserted primacy. Others with no western land claims, like
Maryland, insisted that Congress assert control. Maryland refused to ratify
the Articles of Confederation until such land disputes were resolved to its
liking.34 The Confederation Congress, derided then and since as structurally
insufficient for administering a large republic, was remarkably successful in
negotiating the cession of western land claims from the original states to the
national government.35
Second, Congress created a land acquisition system by which large tracts
of newly acquired territory would be placed on a path to statehood.
Although Congress would ultimately abandon this policy more than 100
years later in the wake of the Spanish-American War, it adopted the initial
policy as it faced the pressing question of what to do with federal territory.
From the land ceded by both the British in the Treaty of Paris and the states
in the mid-1780s, two federal administrative districts emerged under the
Confederation Congress: the Northwest Territory and the Southwest
Territory. Thomas Jefferson, Virginia’s delegate to the Confederation
Congress in 1783 and 1784, drafted a bill for the governance of federal
territory. This proposal called for the creation of fourteen new states to be
33

34
35

See Christopher Tomlins, The Legal Cartography of Colonization, the Legal Polyphony of Settlement: English
Intrusions on the American Mainland in the Seventeenth Century, 26 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 315, 316 (2001)
(“Essentially, the exercise of writing charters furnished projectors with means to plan enterprises
whose dimensions in practice could not be known with any certainty.”).
Merrill Jensen, The Creation of the National Domain, 1781–1784, 26 MISS. VALLEY HIST. REV. 323,
323 (1939).
Id.; see also JACK N. RAKOVE, THE BEGINNINGS OF NATIONAL POLITICS: AN INTERPRETIVE
HISTORY OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 156 (1979) (describing the original states’ willingness
to sell off their western land). But see Jack P. Greene, The Background of the Articles of Confederation, 12
PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 15, 15–44 (1982).
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formed in the Northwest Territory, and required that such states enter the
Union as members equal to the original thirteen. Jefferson’s national vision
in 1784 did not include a role for vast and permanent federal property.
Although Congress later amended Jefferson’s statehood process, and
mercifully ignored his proposed state names, the founding-era policy that
new large tracts of land ought to be divided and admitted into the Union as
states was written into law when Congress passed the Ordinance of 1784.36
Jefferson’s model permeated future Acts of Congress concerned with the
administration of new territorial acquisitions. Congress debated and passed
the Northwest Ordinance in the summer of 1787, as the Constitutional
Convention met in Philadelphia. Several members of the Convention took
leave to attend Congress, likely for the express purpose of passing the
Northwest Ordinance.37 The Northwest Ordinance modified Jefferson’s
requirements for statehood and set forth a more detailed plan for the
administration of unorganized federal territory. In short, Congress exercised
plenary authority in the territories, but placed organized territories on a path
to statehood, with limited self-governance in the interim.
The third important land policy of the 1780s was that the vital work of
transferring federal territory into private hands was a job for Congress, not
the states. In the Land Ordinance of 1785, Congress set forth a process for
the systematic surveying, dividing, and selling of public land to private
landholders, with reservations made in each township for the establishment
of public schools.38 Through this Act, Congress created a geographergeneral, with several subordinates, whose job it was to survey the public lands
and return the plats to the Treasury Office.39 The Treasury Office would
then direct commissioners of regional land offices to sell the land at public
auction.40 The army was authorized to remove squatters on public lands.41
As Milton Conover notes, the regional land offices “did much to bring the
people of the West into close relationship with the national government.”42
36

37

38
39
40
41
42

Jefferson proposed names for ten new states: Sylvania, Michigania, Cherronesus, Assenisipia,
Metropotamia, Illinoia, Saratoga, Washington, Polypotamia, and Pelipsia. See COMM. FOR THE
W. TERRITORY, 5TH CONFEDERATION CONG., RES. ON WESTERN TERRITORY GOVERNMENT,
(1784), available at https://www.loc.gov/item/mtjbib000873/; Reginald Horsman, Thomas Jefferson
and the Ordinance of 1784, 79 ILL. HIST. J. 99, 108 (1986) (describing how Jefferson drew upon Native
American, Anglo-Saxon and British, and colonial American cultures to craft names for the states).
See RICHARD BEEMAN, PLAIN, HONEST MEN: THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION
216 (2009) (“It appears quite likely . . . that the Georgia and North Carolina members traveled to
New York for the express purpose of providing a quorum in Congress so that the ordinance could
be adopted.”).
28 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1789, at 375 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1933).
Id.
Id.
Id.
MILTON CONOVER, THE GENERAL LAND OFFICE: ITS HISTORY, ACTIVITIES AND
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Conover suggests this close relationship helped settlers “develop their faith in
the justice of lawful methods of disposing of the public domain.”43 As we
shall see, many western representatives in the twentieth and twenty-first
century hold a different view of the “justice” of national land management.
Notably, the process for transferring land to private ownership bypassed
local governmental involvement even after statehood. The sale of public
lands was an important revenue source for the fledgling national
government.44 From the Founding, including the period prior to the
ratification of the Constitution, disposal of the public domain was a federal
endeavor.
This establishment of congressional plenary authority, then, predated
the Constitution but was did not go uncontested for several decades. The
question of congressional primacy was not fully settled until well after
ratification.45 Indeed, some legal thinkers and elected officials today suggest
that Congress is under constitutional obligation to transfer federal territory
to state control following statehood.46 Although these latter groups have yet
to persuade Congress to engage in a wholesale transfer of public land, they
nevertheless articulate the discontent of some westerners.
Having established its tentative primacy, Congress quickly adopted land
policies in the 1780s. Some early influential American thinkers suggested the
United States adopt a land-retention policy for federal territory.47 However,

43
44

45
46

47

ORGANIZATION 8 (1923).
Id.
See, e.g., ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE
TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES
AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 283–86 (William Young Birch & Abraham Small
eds., 1803) (“The western territory ought to be regarded as a national stock of wealth.”).
See Greg Ablavsky, The Rise of Federal Title, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 631, 695 (“The rise of federal title
questions this commonplace assumption about the historical primacy of local control.”).
See, e.g., John W. Howard et al., LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE LEGAL CONSULTING SERVICES TEAM
PREPARED FOR THE UTAH COMMISSION FOR THE STEWARDSHIP OF PUBLIC LANDS 51 (2015),
https://le.utah.gov/interim/2015/pdf/00005590.pdf (explaining legal theories for state control). In
2016, prior to Donald Trump’s election, the State of Utah was preparing to file a lawsuit against the
federal government asking the Court to order the United States to patent federal land in Utah to the
State. See Robert Gehrke, Utah’s Lawsuit over Federal Lands Nearly Ready, Expenses Questioned, SALT LAKE
TRIB. (June 10, 2016), http://archive.sltrib.com/article.php?id=3984279&itype=cmsid.
St. George Tucker argued that the United States should dispose of just enough land to pay off the
national debt, but no more. Tucker’s concern was that the proceeds from disposition of valuable
land in the west would cause federal coffers to overflow. This was a bad thing because it might
[L]ay the foundation of so large a revenue, independent of the people, as to be formidable
in the hands of any government. To amass immense riches to defray the expenses of
ambition when occasion may prompt, without seeming to oppress the people, has
uniformly been the policy of tyrants. Should such a policy creep into our government, and
the sales of land, instead of being appropriated to the discharge of former debts, be
converted to a treasure in a bank, those who can at any time command it, may be tempted
to apply it to the most nefarious purposes.
TUCKER, supra note 44, at 283–86.
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Congressional policy beginning in 1785 was to dispose of most federal lands,
primarily though sale to the public, but also by small land transfers to states.48
And while disposition remained the official policy of the United States until
1976 when Congress passed the Federal Land Policy and Management Act
(“FLPMA”), federal policy began to shift to retention, conservation, and
preservation in the late 1800s,49 with the most important policy changes
taking place between 1864 (the creation of Yosemite State Park) and 1946
(the creation of the Bureau of Land Management by the merger of the
General Land Office with the United States Grazing Service). Congress
passed the Antiquities Act in 1906 as it adopted more explicit preservation
policies in addition to already existing conservation policies.50
As the nation’s public lands policies shifted from disposal to conservation
and preservation, Congress initially struggled with how to enforce its policies.
For example, when Congress first showed interest in reserving public lands,
its initial instinct was to transfer such land to state control, with conditions
placed upon use. For this reason, Congress initially organized Yosemite as a
California state park, under state control. Decades later, after becoming
convinced of alleged incompetence and corruption of California’s
management of public lands, and also after witnessing the apparent success
of federal management of national parks in the federal territories of
Wyoming and Washington, Congress reversed course and insisted that
reserved public lands be managed federally.51 Following a long campaign

48

49

50

51

After the Founding, the disposition of federal lands proceeded apace. Congress created the General
Land Office in 1812 to handle the large amount of disposition work going through the Department
of the Treasury. CONOVER, supra note 42, at 3. By placing responsibility for land policy within
the Department of the Treasury, Congress underscored the revenue-raising nature of federal lands.
Congress moved the General Land Office to the newly-created Department of the Interior in 1849.
Id. While the policy of the United States continued to be to put the public domain into private
hands, Congress began to focus less on revenue-generating sales, and more on using the public
lands as a nationalizing project.
The idea that some public lands should be preserved, and that some natural resources should be
conserved, gained steam in the latter end of the nineteenth century. Congress commissioned four
grand-scale surveys of the American West in the 1870s, led by John Wesley Powell, Ferdinand
Hayden, Clarence King, and George Wheeler. RICHARD A. BARTLETT, GREAT SURVEYS OF THE
AMERICAN WEST 373 (1962). Congress sought to create a uniform federal lands policy with the
creation of a Public Lands Commission in 1879. Id. From these ad hoc surveys and Public Lands
Commission findings was born the U.S. Geological Survey in 1879, a permanent bureau housed
within the Department of the Interior charged with researching and understanding the geography
and geology of the public lands, most of which were located in the American West. Id.
For a scholarly treatment of the distinction between conservation and preservation, see Jean-Frédéric
Morin & Amandine Orsini, Conservation and Preservation, in ESSENTIAL CONCEPTS OF GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE 40 (Jean-Frédéric Morin & Amandine Orsini eds., 2015).
See George G. MacKenzie, Despoiling the Yosemite: An Official Report that is Full of Falsehoods, N.Y. TIMES
(July 20, 1980), https://www.nytimes.com/1890/07/20/archives/despoiling-the-yosemite-anofficial-report-that-is-full-of.html; George G. MacKenzie, Needs of the Yosemite: Natural Beauty Destroyed
by Bad Management, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 1890), https://www.nytimes.com/1890/02/23/archives/
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by John Muir and Robert Underwood, Congress first created Yosemite
National Park to surround the State Park, and then ultimately repurchased
Yosemite State Park from California in 1906, the same year it passed the
Antiquities Act.52
During the 1870s, Congress passed a series of public lands management
bills, designed to bring some uniformity and stability to the law of the public
domain, and also to conserve diminishing resources and preserve natural
beauty. Congress created Yellowstone National Park in 1872, to be followed
by others.53 The General Mining Act of 1872 codified the law governing
mining claims on public lands.54 The Timber Culture Act of 1873 sought to
encourage homesteaders to plant and conserve trees on their land.55 The
Desert Land Act of 1877 sought to encourage the cultivation of arid lands in
the Southwest.56 In addition, the Timber and Stone Act of 1878 allowed
individuals to purchase land that was deemed unfit for agriculture, so that
they might exploit the timber and mineral resources.57 This Act, like the
original Homestead Act, was designed to get such property into the hands of
the hardy yeomen of Jefferson’s dreams. But, like the Homestead Act, much
of the land granted under the Timber and Stone Act ended up in the hands
of large companies. They continued to clear-cut timbered land in the 1880s,
giving rise to concerns about deforestation, which led to forest reserve
legislation and the delegation of Property Clause power to the President,
discussed in Part II. Congress passed all of these acts pursuant to its Property
Clause power—its power to pass “needful rules and regulations” for property
belonging to the United States. 58
Congressional efforts to conserve and preserve the American West in the
1870s and 1880s were unsuccessful, partly because such policies were
sometimes contradicted by other goals, but also because Congress, by itself,
lacked real executive management power. Congress thus began to involve
the executive branch in the management of public lands to a much greater
extent in the 1890s. These delegations of discretionary management power
to the President are discussed more fully in Part II. Briefly, though, these

52
53
54
55
56
57
58

needs-of-the-yosemite-natural-beauty-destroyed-by-bad-management-a.html;
George
G.
MacKenzie, The Neglected Yosemite: Some Inexcusable Faults of Management, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 1980),
https://www.nytimes.com/1890/02/16/archives/the-neglected-yosemite-some-inexcusablefaults-of-management-not.html.
See STEPHEN R. FOX, JOHN MUIR AND HIS LEGACY: THE AMERICAN CONSERVATION
MOVEMENT 99 (1981).
GATES, supra note 32, at 566.
Id. at 723.
Id. at 399–400.
Id. at 401.
Id. at 550–51.
U.S. CONST. art IV, § 3, cl. 2.
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delegations to the President served and continue to serve as the catalyst for
controversy.
Understanding the changes to federal land policy in the nineteenth
century is critical to analyzing the legal questions raised as Congress and the
Executive asserted greater power over the land in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries. In the early nineteenth century, Congress sought
to dispose of the public domain as a revenue-raising venture. During the
Civil War, Congress continued to dispose of the land, not to raise revenue
but to encourage western settlement, relieve overcrowded cities in the East,
and “harvest . . . good citizens.”59 Also during the Civil War, Congress for
the first time withdrew some public lands from settlement due to their scenic
beauty. In the late nineteenth century, as we will see, Congress sought to
enlist greater help from the Executive branch in the conservation and
preservation of natural resources on public lands in the West.
Because the shift from a land policy of disposal to one of retention
occurred as western territories were joining the Union as states, federal land
ownership in the United States is largely concentrated in the West:
This history and distribution of public lands creates disparity between
East and West. Western states that are comprised of mostly federal land lack
the same property tax base as eastern states, at least proportionately.60
Further, western states generally do not enjoy the same ability to foster the
development of profit-oriented (and taxable) resource extraction and related
businesses.61 And, most relevant for this discussion, people living in western
states or on western tribal lands feel the effects of unilateral executive
decisions regarding public lands management to a greater degree than those
living elsewhere. Some states and scholars even argue that Congress is
required to sell off its land, or transfer it to the states under the Equal Footing
Doctrine and/or the Equal Sovereignty Doctrine.62 Whether or not they are
59

60

61

62

Public Lands Commission, Report of the Public Lands Commission, Created by The Act of March
3, 1879, Relating to Public Lands in the Western Portion of the United States and to the Operation
of Existing Land Laws, at VIII (1880).
Because the national government does not pay property taxes, Congress allocates to states
Payments in Lieu of Taxes (“PILT”) for federally-held property in their states. Western state
representatives often argue that the payments are far too low to compensate for lost revenue where
the federal government owns such large tracts of land. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Senator Mike
Lee, Lee Gets Vote on Amendment to Increase PILT Payments (Mar. 23, 2013),
https://www.lee.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/press-releases?ID=6e7f7c10-fb8f-44d2-8dcff2f14380a8a7 (“PILT payments tend to be a small fraction of what the local governments could
generate through property taxes . . . .”).
See, e.g., National Monuments Have a Monumental Impact on the U.S. Economy, WILDERNESS SOC’Y (July
10,
2015),
[https://web.archive.org/web/20171211212603/http://wilderness.org/blog/
national-monuments-have-monumental-impact-us-economy] (last visited Jan. 16, 2019)
(countering that large National Parks encourage alternative industries, such as tourism).
Howard et al., supra note 46, at 51–52.

778

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 21:3

correct, many westerners feel slighted by the public lands arrangement.
Their discontent has manifested itself in the Sagebrush Rebellion of the
1970s and 1980s, the actions of Cliven Bundy and his associates more
recently, and in proposed state and federal land management restructuring
legislation in western jurisdictions and in Congress.63
II. THE NATURE OF THE PROPERTY CLAUSE
What is the nature of the Property Clause? Is it a legislative power or an
executive one?
Could it be something else? We are accustomed to
classifying all governmental power one of three ways—legislative, executive,
and judicial. Further, we assume that if a particular power is constitutionally
vested in, say, the legislative branch, then it must be a legislative power. Such
an assumption supposes one of two things: either (1) governmental powers
have no inherent nature, but are classified only by who exercises the power;
or (2) governmental powers are inherently legislative, judicial or executive
and the Founders managed to place each and every one precisely in the
branch of government that corresponds to its nature. Neither supposition is
true. At its heart, the Property Clause is an administrative power which,
under the British system, belonged to the King. The power contains
rulemaking elements that the owner of any property owner has to regulate
conduct on private property, as well as executive elements to sell, lease, fence,
etc. In this Part, I will demonstrate the hybrid nature of the Property Clause
by appealing to its placement in Article IV, the nature of congressional
delegations thereof, and judicial interpretations of the same. Then in
Part III, I will explain why this hybrid nature suggests limited judicial review
for public land management decisions, including those for National
Monuments.
A. Why Article IV?
The origins of the Property Clause are inextricably intertwined with that
of the Admission Clause, which may help explain its placement in Article IV,
instead of Article I. Resolution Fourteen of the Virginia Plan, finalized by
James Madison as he impatiently waited for the other delegates to show up
to the Constitutional Convention, was a proposal “that provision ought to be
made for the admission of States, lawfully arising within the limits of the
United States.”64 This resolution passed the Committee of the Whole
unanimously on July 18, 1787 with little discussion. Madison was not a part
63

64

See, e.g., Action Plan for Public Lands and Education Act of 2011, H.R. 2852, 112th Cong. (2011)
(“The Federal Government is the source and potential solver of [western states’ financial problems]
because of the enormous amount of untaxed land the Federal government owns in Wester States.”).
1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 226 (Max Farrand ed., 1911).
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of the Committee of Detail, however, which the Convention commissioned
to re-draft the accepted resolutions into articles of a new constitution. That
committee, led by John Rutledge, Edmund Randolph, and James Wilson,
re-wrote Resolution Fourteen as Article XVII. It read:
New States lawfully constituted or established within the limits of the United
States may be admitted, by the Legislature, into this Government. . . . If the
admission be consented to, the new States shall be admitted on the same
terms with the original States. But the Legislature may make conditions with
the new States, concerning the public debt which shall be then subsisting.65

The Admission Clause at that point still lacked an explicit property
disposition and regulation component—an oversight the delegates soon
corrected. The Committee of Detail presented their work to the Convention
on August 6 and the delegates began methodically debating each Article.
The first time the convention saw anything resembling the current Property
Clause was on August 18, when it heard a proposal that Congress would
have power “[t]o dispose of the unappropriated lands of the United States.”66
The proposition was not voted upon until the end of August, when Congress
began considering the Admission Clause. Congress debated whether new
states should enter the Union “on the same terms” as existing states.
Gouverneur Morris argued they should not. 67 He stated he “did not wish to
bind down the Legislature to admit Western States on terms here stated”—
equal footing—and he did not wish to “throw the power” into the hands of
western states.68 James Madison, propounder of the large republic theory
and close confidant of Thomas Jefferson, rose in opposition to Morris
“insisting that the Western States neither would nor ought to submit to a
Union which degraded them from an equal rank with the other States.”69
Morris’s motion passed with the help of other delegates who expressed the
sentiment that at some future point it might become inconvenient to admit
new States on terms of equality.70
65
66
67
68
69

70

2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 188 (Max Farrand ed., 1911).
Id. at 321.
Id.
Id.
Id. In reviewing the records of the Convention in Philadelphia, especially the debates, a word of
caution is warranted regarding the accuracy of the records. Most of the reconstruction of the
debates draws from Madison’s notes. Madison, however, revised his notes throughout his life. See
MARY SARAH BILDER, MADISON’S HAND: REVISING THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 179
(2015) (“These changes and many small editorial revisions began to transform the Notes from a
diary into a report of debates.”). The debate described by Madison on August 29, 1787 is consistent
with the changes made to the work of the Committee of Detail. Madison, however, may have not
fully registered his objection during the Convention. The statements Madison attributes to
Gouverneur Morris are consistent with Morris’s later recollections of the Convention.
4 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 544–45 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
Although Morris won the battle at the Convention, he would ultimately lose the war. Equal Footing
did obtain status as a constitutional principle. That status derives from (1) the Northwest
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Against this backdrop of debate about the relative powers of the national
and state governments, Gouverneur Morris introduced a revamped Property
Clause. Mindful of the need for someone to exercise sovereign power in the
federal territories prior to statehood, Morris proposed, “the Legislature
[Congress] shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and
regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging the United
States.”71 It also sought to ensure that under the new Constitution the federal
government would continue to handle the disposition of land, even after the
organization of new states out of federal territory.72 This proposal passed the
Committee of the Whole.73
Following the extensive debate in August and the first week of
September, the Convention sent the document to a Committee of Style to
rearrange and add “polish” to the Articles. Although Gouverneur Morris
had not been on the Committee of Detail, he took the lead in redrafting the
Constitution in the Committee of Style, and Madison later praised is work—
“[a] better choice could not have been made.”74 The Admission and
Property Clauses that went into the Committee of Style as Article XVII came
out as Article IV, Section 3. The Convention agreed to that section without
amendment and it was thus placed in the final document.75
Much of constitutional law is teased out of the structure of the document,
not the words. The great principles underlying the text—separation of
powers, judicial review, federalism—all derive from an analysis of the
structure of the document. Thus, the Committee of Style’s important work
in rearranging the articles is of immense constitutional import. And yet,

71
72
73
74
75

Ordinance, (2) the practice of Congress to invoke “Equal Footing” in each statehood enabling act,
and (3) Supreme Court precedent. All of these practices served to constitutionalize or, in the words
of Madison—“liquidate”—Equal Footing. See William Baude, Constitutional Liquidation, 71 STAN.
L. REV. 1, 1 (2019). Sixteen years later, after the United States had completed its purchase of the
Louisiana Territory in 1803 and the question of administration of new territory presented itself, not
for the first or last time, Morris exchanged letters with Henry Livingston discussing the
Constitutional Convention and particularly the Admission and Property Clauses. Morris stated
that it was his belief that Congress could not admit a new state from any territory that did not
already belong to the United States in 1787. “I always thought that, when we should acquire
Canada and Louisiana it would be proper to govern them as provinces, and allow them no voice
in our councils.” However, he was quick to add that the reason he did not insert more explicit
language to that effect was that because a “strong opposition would have been made,” suggesting
he was in the minority at the Convention on this point. 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 404 (Max Farrand ed., 1911).
3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 578; see also U.S. CONST. art. IV,
§ 3, cl. 2.
Id.
3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 70, at 582.
See RICHARD BROOKHISER, GENTLEMAN REVOLUTIONARY: GOUVERNEUR MORRIS—THE
RAKE WHO WROTE THE CONSTITUTION 89–90 (2003).
4 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 70, at 545 (1987).
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unfortunately, we have very little direct evidence of Morris’ and the
Committee’s decision-making process. Essentially, we have only the
document they produced, and some scattered statements made after the fact
over the course of decades. The big drafting question for present purposes
is: Why is the Property Clause in Article IV instead of Article I where
virtually all other congressional powers are housed?
I have already suggested one possible reason—the Admission Clause and
the Property Clause were too closely related to separate. Article IV speaks
mainly to (1) the relationship among states, and (2) the relationship between
the national government and the states. The constitutional provision by
which new states would be admitted by Congress thus fit naturally with other
similar provisions—such as the one by which Congress guarantees to each
state a republican form of government.76 Since states were to be erected out
of federal territory, it would make sense to place the provision granting
Congress the power to regulate federal territory next to the one granting
Congress the power to admit new states.
Let me suggest one other possible reason the Property Clause found its
way to Article IV. The Constitution’s approach to federal territory stood in
marked contrast to Great Britain’s manner for regulating its national
domain. The appropriately named “Crown Lands” (or Royal Demesne)
were subject to the plenary power of the monarch. That is, that land
belonged to the Crown, and the King could govern it as he saw fit. Only
after the King disposed of vast amounts of land to fund questionable activities
did Parliament seek to regulate their disposition. Even then, Parliament did
not seek to legislate private conduct on those lands—that remained the
prerogative of the King.77 Under the British system, managing the national
domain was an executive affair, not a legislative one. For this reason, the
Proclamation of 1763 was promulgated through the King as a
proclamation—instead of through Parliament as a law, even though the
King’s ministers were largely responsible for its drafting and adoption.78
Under the Constitution, the Convention did not want the public domain
managed by the President out of concern that it was too much power in one
person’s hands.
Therefore, the power went to Congress instead.
Nevertheless, the Convention did not conceive of the management of
property as a legislative power. Rather, it remained administrative. As such,
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See U.S. CONST. art IV, § 4.
See Michael McConnell, Professor and Director of the Constitutional Law Ctr., Stanford Law
School, Tanner Lectures on Human Values at Princeton University: The President Who Would
Not Be King: Executive Power and the Constitution (Nov. 29, 2018) (on file with author); see also
Daniel W. Hollis, III, The Crown Lands and the Financial Dilemma in Stuart England, 26 ALBION 419,
419–22 (1994) (detailing the King’s authority over Crown Lands).
See R.A. Humphreys, Lord Shelburne and the Proclamation of 1763, 49 ENG. HIST. REV. 241, 241–64
(1934).
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it was separated from more traditional legislative functions. Public lands
management was, and remains to this day, an administrative power housed
in Congress.
Although the Admission and Property Clauses of Article IV garnered
some attention during the ratification debates, the discussion centered mainly
around its implication for existing states, as it had during the Convention—
that is, Ratifiers were concerned with whether territory from existing states
might be carved out for new states. The proposition that Congress could
institute rules and regulations for federal territory lying outside the
jurisdiction of states was not a major point of disagreement, though it would
become one in the years leading up to the Civil War.
Finally, Greg Ablavsky persuasively shows that federal dominance of the
public domain was not fully settled in 1787 or 1789, despite the apparent
lack of concern about the Property Clause during the ratifying debates. The
“rise of federal title” only became relatively settled through a series of postfounding moments in the 1790s and the first decade of the nineteenth century
involving the admission of western states and the securing of private titles.79
And while theories of state control of the public domain occasionally find
their way into state and federal proposals, congressional plenary power over
public lands remains secure.
B. Past Delegations
To be certain, Congress has delegated various aspects of its Property
Clause power to the Executive since the Founding. These early delegations
involved the power to dispose land and the power to govern territorial
inhabitants through the promulgation of territorial law, enforcement
mechanisms, and a fledgling judiciary. However, in the late 1800s Congress
enlisted the aid of the President in managing the federal public domain and
granted him immense discretion.
1. Disposition Power
In 1789 the Treasury Department, which became part of the newlycreated Executive Branch, continued the role it had played under the Articles
of Confederation in surveying and selling the public domain. Because the
sale of land was intended to pay down the nation’s debt, the Treasury
Department seemed to be the most logical governmental entity for
conducting land sales. And given the nation’s policy of disposition, an
immense amount of work needed to be performed (eventually giving rise to
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See Ablavsky, supra note 45, at 695.

Feb. 2019]

THE HYBRID NATURE OF THE PROPERTY CLAUSE

783

the phrase “land office business”).80 Although initial attempts to create a
general land office died in Congress in 1789 and 1791, Congress finally
created one in 1812.81 The Land Office remained housed in the Treasury
Department but grew to be larger than other cabinet-level departments. To
underscore the executive nature of the business, each land patent had to be
signed by the President or Secretary of State until 1836. The Land Office
was transferred to the Department of the Interior upon the creation of that
Department in 1849.82 The General Land Office was discontinued in 1946.
2. Territorial Governance
Congressional power to create territorial governance also derives from
its Property Clause power to pass “all needful rules and regulations” for
federal territory.83 One of the first acts of the First Congress was to reauthorize the Northwest Ordinance. Both the Northwest Ordinance and the
Southwest Ordinance created territorial governments with officials
appointed directly by Congress, including a governor, secretary, and three
judges.84 However, direct congressional appointment of territory officials
was not to last. Beginning with the Organic Act for the Indiana Territory in
1800 and for every territorial Organic Act since then, Congress has delegated
the appointment power to the President, who has appointed governors,
secretaries and judges for each territory since 1800. Incidentally, the
Organic Acts of the territories do not grant the President an explicit removal
power for territorial officials. Nevertheless, presidents have not hesitated to
remove territorial officials, including those appointed by their predecessors.
Indeed, presidents have often removed territorial officials precisely because
they had been appointed by their predecessors.85 When Congress delegated
Property Clause power to the President to appoint territorial officials, it did
not give him a one-way ratchet, despite the lack of explicit removal powers.
The Supreme Court upheld as constitutional congressional power to
organize territories, including presidential appointment of territorial officials,
in American Insurance Co. v. Canter.86 Congress thus began delegating to the
President specific management powers in 1891. Three important pieces of
legislation passed near the turn of the century granted the President specific
80
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See generally MALCOLM ROHRBOUGH, THE LAND OFFICE BUSINESS: THE SETTLEMENT AND
ADMINISTRATION OF AMERICAN PUBLIC LANDS (1968).
See Act of Apr. 25, 1812, ch. 68, 2 Stat. 716.
See Conover, supra note 42, at 8.
U.S. CONST. art IV, § 3, cl. 2.
32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 281 (Roscoe R. Hill ed., 1936)
(detailing Article III of the Northwest Ordinance).
See John S. Goff, The Appointment, Tenure, and Removal of Territorial Judges: Arizona—A Case Study, 12
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 211, 224–31 (1986). Similarly, the Antiquities Act does not grant the President
an express rescission power. Presidents have nevertheless exercised rescission in the past.
26 U.S. 511, 546 (1828).
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land management power—all made in response to concerns about extraction
activities occurring on public lands.
3. Power to Reserve Public Lands—Specific Delegations
When Congress sought to reserve public lands from resource extraction,
it quickly realized that administrative power was essential to (1) identify land
deserving of protection; and (2) police activity on reserved lands. Each time
that Congress identified a new threatening activity on public lands, it enlisted
the President not only as its enforcement agent, but also granted the
President immense discretion regarding what rules and regulations to
promulgate to best preserve the resources. Interestingly, in each of the
following three delegations of the Property Clause power, Congress gave
power to the President to reserve land by a royal-sounding “Proclamation,”
suggesting something of a return to the British method in which the King
enjoyed immense discretion to manage the Crown Lands.
a. Forest Reserve Act
To better manage forests on federal land in a uniform and energetic way,
Congress took action in 1891. In March of that year, on the last day of the
legislative session, Congress proposed a Forest Reserve Act that would
delegate power to the President under the Property Clause to identify and
withdraw from the public domain forested lands, and set them aside as
reserves. Such lands would not be sold or otherwise disposed of, and logging
thereon would be regulated. Representatives from the Northeast were
largely in favor of this delegation of power. However, during the debate over
the Forest Reserve Act, representatives from other regions expressed concern
at the “extraordinary and dangerous power” granted to the President.87
Representative Mark Dunnell of Minnesota called the bill a “monstrous
measure . . . a vast power to give to the President.”88
Notwithstanding these objections, Congress passed the Forest Reserve
Act and gave the President wide discretion to choose land that is worthy of
protection, similar to the broad discretion that would later be given to the
President in the Antiquities Act: “[T]he President of the United States may,
from time to time, set apart and reserve . . . any part of the public lands
wholly or in part covered with timber or undergrowth, whether of
commercial value or not, as public reservations . . . .”89
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32 CONG. REC. 3614 (1891) (statement of Rep. Thomas C. McRae).
Id. (statement of Rep. Mark Dunnell).
Forest Reserve Act, Pub. L. No. 51-561, § 24, 26 Stat. 1095, 1103 (1891).
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Three weeks later, President Benjamin Harrison first exercised power
under the Act to set aside a tract of land in Wyoming as a forest reserve.90
Harrison, Grover Cleveland and William McKinley each utilized the act to
collectively proclaim forty-five million acres of the public domain as forest
reserves.91 Theodore Roosevelt would use the Act even more aggressively.92
These executive actions received strong support in the East and Midwest but,
in what would become a pattern, were opposed by western states where the
reserves were located.93
b. Antiquities Act
The opening scene of Indiana Jones and the Last Crusade depicts young
Indiana’s attempt to prevent a private antiquities collector from taking
possession of an ancient artifact.94 Setting aside the exciting chase involving
horses, trains, snakes, and a lion, the scene underscores a reality of the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. During this period, non-Indian
settlers and explorers explored well-preserved ancient settlements on public
lands in the American Southwest, particularly in Chaco Canyon and Mesa
Verde. Both professional and amateur collectors raided the sites. According
to Mark Squillace, “[a] consensus had emerged among policy officials that
this practice had to be stopped and that even . . . qualified researchers had
to be carefully regulated.”95 Squillace adds, “There seems little doubt that
the impetus for the law . . . was the desire of archeologists to protect
aboriginal objects and artifacts.”96
The operable language of the Antiquities Act states that:
[T]he President . . . is hereby authorized . . . to declare by public
proclamation historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures, and
other objects of historic or scientific interest that are situated upon the lands
owned or controlled by the Government of the United States to be national
monuments, and may reserve as a part thereof parcels of land, the limits of
which . . . shall be confined to the smallest area compatible with the proper
care and management of the objects to be protected . . . .97
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Cécile Brooks-Nicolopoulos, Forest Policy (1890–1910): The Impact of Two Pioneering Decades, 70
REVUE FRANÇAISE D’ETUDES AMÉRICAINES 28, 31 (1996).
Id.
Id. (“Theodore Roosevelt . . . did more for the conservation movement in his seven years in office
than any administration before him.”)
See Bassman, supra note 25, at 509–10.
INDIANA JONES AND THE LAST CRUSADE (Paramount Pictures 1989).
Mark Squillace, The Monumental Legacy of the Antiquities Act of 1906, 37 GA. L. REV. 473, 477–78 (2003).
Id. at 477.
Antiquities Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-209, § 2, 34 Stat. 225, 225 (1906) (codified as amended at
54 U.S.C. § 320301(a) (2012)). Through the Act, Congress also made it a crime to “appropriate,
excavate, injure, or destroy” historic or prehistoric ruins or antiquities located on U.S. land. Id.
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Squillace notes that the legislative history of the Antiquities Act suggests that
various factions argued over the expansiveness of the power in the drafting
of the bill. Some Congressmen sought a wide-ranging power that would give
the President the authority to declare monuments over areas of scenic
beauty. Others, primarily from the West, sought to restrict the power.98
Both received some concessions in the final bill, ensuring that the law would
continue to be debated for more than a century. Those seeking a restrictive
power inserted language that the President could declare an amount of land
that was “confined to the smallest area compatible with the proper care and
management of the objects to be protected.”99 And although the language
from earlier bills that would have protected lands based on their “scenic
beauty, natural wonders or curiosities” was stricken, the law nevertheless
protects “objects of historic and scientific interest.”100 This latter language is
broad enough to encompass areas of scenic beauty since such areas may be
said to always be scientifically interesting.
Congress perceived that it could not act quickly enough to identify and
protect archeological sites needing protection. It delegated its power to the
President, who was better suited to act swiftly. Congress effectively
recognized that this aspect of property management was not legislative in
nature, but administrative and executive.
c. Pickett Act
In 1909, Congress became alarmed at an oil rush occurring on public
lands in western states. Under then-extant mining laws, prospectors staked
claims to mining sites and drilled for oil on the public domain. Growing
demand for oil, coupled with new technologies for identifying and extracting
it, led to a massive oil boom.101 The head of the U.S. Geological Survey
warned the Secretary of Interior that all western oil might be claimed within
a few months, meaning that the United States would need to buy back for its
own use oil extracted from U.S. lands.102 Congress passed the Pickett Act in
1910, which gave power to the President to remove tracts of land temporarily
from the public domain to prevent the assertion of mining claims thereon.103
As it turns out, the Act was unnecessary: the Supreme Court later upheld
presidential power to remove these lands even in the absence of congressional
delegation.104 This important case will be addressed in the next Section.
98
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Squillace, supra, note 95, at 477–78.
Antiquities Act of 1906 § 2.
Squillace, supra note 95, at 477–78.
GATES, supra note 32, at 730.
Id. at 732–33.
Pickett Act, ch. 421, Pub. L. No. 61-303, 36 Stat. 847 (1910).
United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 483 (1915).
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In addition to these three specific delegations of Property Clause power
to reserve land, Congress also created important structural changes within
the Executive Branch in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
which facilitated the management of public lands. These structural changes
include the creation of the U.S. Geological Survey in 1879,105 the creation of
grazing districts in 1934,106 and the creation of the Bureau of Land
Management in 1946.107
C. Judicial Interpretations of the Nature of the Property Clause
In a series of cases from the late 1800 and early 1900s, the Court
expounded the nature of the Property Clause, as it was asked to decide the
appropriateness of congressional delegations of the same. The Court
continually described the Property Clause as something other than a purely
legislative power. This characterization led the Court to a position of
deference toward Congress and the President.
1. Camfield v. United States
In Camfield, private property owners in Colorado had, through a clever
fencing system, managed to effectively enclose public lands with fences that
were placed entirely on their own private property.108 The fencing made it
impossible for anyone other than the private property owners to access the
public lands for grazing. In the course of ruling that the private property
owners must remove the fences, the Court stated that the government has,
with respect to its own lands, the rights of an “ordinary proprietor” to
maintain its possession and to prosecute trespassers.109 The government was
allowed to protect its property from nuisance as any property owner might.
“It may deal with such lands precisely as a private individual may deal with
his farming property.”110 Congressional power over its property was, at least
in the Camfield case, more analogous to the rights of a private property holder
than that of a national legislature charged with regulating private conduct
pursuant to enumerated powers.
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GATES, supra note 32, at 422.
Id. at 610.
Id. at 128.
Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518 (1897).
Id. at 524.
Id.
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2. Butte City Water Co. v. Baker
Could Congress delegate its land management responsibilities to another
department of government? The Court faced this question in a case
involving mining legislation.111 When Congress first attempted to regulate
mining on public land in 1866, it authorized the mining of public lands
“subject to such regulations as may be prescribed by law, and subject also to
the local customs or rules of miners in the several mining districts so far as
the same may not be in conflict with the laws of the United States.”112
Congress initially instructed courts to adopt the “law” of mining camps
rather than promulgating its own code. When Congress finally prescribed a
general mining law in 1872, it still adopted the Miners Code to fill in the
gaps, as it did in subsequent amendments to the general law.
The validity of the adoption of the Miners Code as the law of the United
States, as well as the constitutionality of Congress’s delegation of its power
under the Property Clause to local legislatures, came before the Court in the
1905 case of Butte City Water Co. v. Baker. There, two parties had a dispute
over a mining claim that was located in the federal public domain within the
State of Montana. The lower courts in Montana resolved the dispute by
referencing Montana law and the Miners Code.113 The aggrieved party
appealed to the United States Supreme Court, arguing that local legislatures
lacked constitutional authority to regulate mining because Article IV,
111
112

113

Butte City Water Co. v. Baker, 196 U.S. 119 (1905).
Act of July 26, 1866, ch. 262, 14. Stat. 251 (1866) (granting right of way to ditch and canal owners
over public land). The history of mining legislation in the United States is an interesting study in
self-governance and federalism. The discovery of valuable minerals in the West, particularly gold
in California in 1849 and silver in Nevada in 1858, led to many mining communities living and
working on public lands. While falling within the legal jurisdiction of the United States, they were
essentially autonomous, falling outside the practical reach of the law. In real and significant ways,
they operated in a legal vacuum.
Just as land claim clubs developed in the Midwest as an ad hoc legal system to address
competing claims to land before the arrival of the General Land Office, mining camps further west
created their own internal rules to recognize mining claims and adjudicate disputes. These “Miners
Codes” regulated the right to and size of claims, how many claims an individual could work, what
work must be done to maintain a claim, and even, in some cases, the amount of water that could
be used on the claim. To enforce the Miners Codes, the miners created regulatory districts,
encompassing several camps. Mining camps took on some of the features of autonomous citystates. The Town of Rough and Ready, California, even voted to secede from the Union in 1850.
Because miners tended to travel from camp to camp and took the Miners Code with them, these
“laws” became remarkably uniform in the American West. The story of the Miners Codes began
to be told as early as 1885 with the publication of a book by Charles Howard Shinn. CHARLES
HOWARD SHINN, THE MINING CAMPS: A STUDY IN AMERICAN FRONTIER GOVERNMENT 234
(Rodman Wilson Paul ed., 1965) (1884); see also Charles W. McCurdy, Stephen J. Field and Public Land
Law Development in California, 1850–1866: A Case Study of Judicial Resource Allocation in Nineteenth Century
America, 10 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 235 (1976) (describing the California Supreme Court’s general
willingness to allow local regulations to operate).
Baker v. Butte City Water Co., 72 P. 617, 618 (1903).
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Section 3 specifically vested the power to make “needful rules and
regulations” of federal property in Congress.114 The Court rejected the
argument, stating that Congress had in 1866 (and again in 1893) specifically
adopted local law, whether it be the Miners Code or state law, as the law of
the public domain.115 Miners’ law was valid insofar as it did not conflict with
state or federal law, and state law was valid insofar as it did not conflict with
federal law.116
The Court’s opinion hinged upon its characterization of the Property
Clause. The Court stated that congressional action under the Property
Clause was “not of a legislative character in its highest sense of the term.”117
The Court continued, “While the disposition of [public] lands is provided for
by Congressional legislation, such legislation savors somewhat of mere rules
prescribed by an owner of property for its disposal.”118 That is, had Congress
been delegating its legislative authority to the states or the miners’ camps, it
may have run afoul of the non-delegation doctrine and the constitutional
principle of separation of powers. However, because the Court found
Congress’s Act to be one delegating property management powers, it was not
unconstitutional. Congress merely enlisted the aid of agents to manage
federal property. The distinction between legislative power and property
management power exists whether Congress is delegating to states and
miners or to the federal executive. A subsequent Court decision, United States
v. Grimaud,119 underscored the constitutional validity of delegating
proprietorship power to the Executive.
3. United States v. Grimaud
As previously mentioned, in response to the forest depletions of the midnineteenth century, Congress gave the President power in 1891 to create
Forest Reserves. Then in 1897, Congress created the Forest Service to
manage the nation’s forests.120 In a bit of an anomaly, Congress housed the
Forest Service in the Department of Agriculture, while the Forest Reserves
themselves remained under the jurisdiction of the Department of Interior
(which was not particularly energetic in its approach to forest management.)
Gifford Pinchot, the nation’s self-appointed forestry expert and first head of
the Forest Service, campaigned for almost a decade to have the Forest
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U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
Butte City Water Co. v. Baker, 196. U.S. 119, 126–27 (1905).
Id. at 127.
Id. at 126.
Id.
220 U.S. 506 (1911).
Organic Act of 1897, ch. 2., 30 Stat. 11, 34.
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Reserves transferred to the Department of Agriculture.121
When he finally succeeded, he renamed the Forest Reserves as “National
Forests,” and immediately began a more aggressive implementation of his
forest management policies, which included placing stricter limitations on
grazing and mineral extraction.122 To engage in those activities, one needed
a permit issued by the Secretary of Agriculture. The permit rule was not
promulgated by Congress, but by Pinchot in the Department of
Agriculture.123 Pinchot also enlarged the number of employees of the Forest
Service, and established forest rangers to police the reserves by arresting
those engaged in unauthorized grazing, mining, and timber removal.124
Such clandestine resource extraction had continued in the 1890s and early
1900s.125
One such person, who had once enjoyed free access to the public domain
for sheep grazing but then resorted to unauthorized grazing, was Pierre
Grimaud. He grazed his sheep without a permit in the Sierra Forest Reserve.
One of Pinchot’s forest rangers arrested him in 1907. Grimaud challenged
his arrest by arguing that the delegation of rulemaking to the Department of
Agriculture was unconstitutional because it was legislation, and legislation
belongs to the domain of Congress, not the Executive.126
Although the lower court agreed with him, the Supreme Court
disagreed. As in Butte City Water Co. v. Baker, the Court stated that the power
given to the Executive in this instance was not legislative in nature. Rather,
it was power like an “owner may delegate to his principal agent.”127
According to the Court, the Executive, as agent for Congress, had
promulgated rules governing the use of government property. Grimaud, the
Court said, made “an unlawful use of the Government’s property.”128
[I]n authorizing the Secretary of Agriculture to meet these local conditions
Congress was merely conferring administrative functions upon an agent, and not delegating
to him legislative power. The authority actually given was much less than what
has been granted to municipalities by virtue of which they make by-laws,
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Stephen Ponder, Gifford Pinchot: Press Agent for Forestry, 31 J. FOREST HIST. 26, 26–35 (1987).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 507 (1911). Pierre Grimaud is the nineteenth-century
version of Cliven Bundy. Bundy’s beef, so to speak, with the United States is nearly identical to
that of Pierre Grimaud. Upset that his family’s ability to graze cattle on the public domain had
been diminished, Bundy and his sons first fought their battle with the Department of the Interior
in federal court, and then on federal lands. See David Montero, Judge Dismisses Case Against Nevada
Rancher Cliven Bundy and his Sons, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2018, 8:15 PM),
https://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-bundy-mistrial-2018-story.html.
Id. at 516 (quoting Butte City Water Co. v. Baker, 196 U.S. 119, 126 (1905)).
Id. at 521.
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ordinances and regulations for the government of towns and cities.129

Not only did the Court distinguish the Property Clause’s legislative features
from its property management ones, it also discussed the nature of the
discretion committed to the Executive in the Forest Reserve Act and its
amendments:
What might be harmless in one forest might be harmful to another. What
might be injurious at one stage of timber growth, or at one season of the
year, might not be so at another.
In the nature of things it was impracticable for Congress to provide
general regulations for these various and varying details of management.
Each reservation had its peculiar and special features . . . .130

Working out the details of which forest deserves reservation status, the size
of those reserves, and the nature of the regulations on the reserves were
details that Congress gave to the Executive branch to work out in its
discretion. The Antiquities Act, as we shall see, similarly gave the Executive
broad discretion in the establishment and regulation of National
Monuments.
4. Light v. United States
In Light v. United States,131 the Court faced a similar issue as it had in
Grimaud—unauthorized grazing. In the course of enjoining a sheepherder
from grazing his sheep on the public domain, the Court articulated a theory
of judicial deference to Congress in the management of public lands.
[I]t is not for courts to say how [public lands] shall be administered. That is
for Congress to determine. The courts cannot compel it to set aside the lands
for settlement; or to suffer them to be used for agricultural or grazing
purposes; nor interfere when, in the exercise of its discretion, Congress
establishes a forest reserve for what it decides to be national and public
purposes. . . . These are rights incident to proprietorship, to say nothing of
the power of the United States as a sovereign over the property belonging to
it.132

While the Supreme Court was perfectly willing to review congressional
legislative action, it took a much more deferential approach to congressional
proprietorship action.
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220 U.S. 523 (1911).
Id. at 537.
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5. United States v. Midwest Oil Co.
As previously mentioned, Congress passed the Pickett Act in response to
the oil boom of the early 1900s.133 Even before the Pickett Act was passed,
President Taft removed public lands in Wyoming and other western states
from oil claims and extraction.134 Midwest Oil asserted a claim to oil in
Wyoming and began extraction activities after Taft’s Proclamation. The
United States filed a claim against Midwest Oil. Midwest Oil argued that
the President’s actions were unconstitutional because he had no specifically
delegated authority from Congress at that time to remove lands.135 The
Supreme Court ruled against Midwest Oil. In doing so, it articulated a
theory of constitutionality based upon congressional acquiescence. After
reviewing a litany of presidential withdrawals conducted without
congressional authorization, the Court stated, “Congress did not repudiate
the power claimed or the withdrawal orders made. On the contrary it
uniformly and repeatedly acquiesced in the practice and, as shown by these
records, there had been, prior to 1910, at least 252 Executive Orders making
reservations for useful, though non-statutory purposes.”136 Then, in
reviewing a line of cases that refused to strike down non-statutory presidential
action, the Court stated:
Nor do these decisions mean that the Executive can by his course of action
create a power. But they do clearly indicate that the long-continued practice, known to
and acquiesced in by Congress, would raise a presumption that the withdrawals
had been made in pursuance of its consent or of a recognized administrative
power of the Executive in the management of the public lands. This is
particularly true in view of the fact that the land is property of the United
States and that the land laws are not of a legislative character in the highest
sense of the term . . . .137

According to the Court, congressional acquiescence in a presidential practice
is evidence of its constitutionality. This was not only the view of the Midwest
Oil Court, but of many prior courts faced with the same question—what to
make of congressional acquiescence? That acquiescence was accorded
deference due to the proprietor nature of the Property Clause. Similar
deference was usually not given with respect to legislative power. As we shall
see, Congress has long acquiesced in the reduction of National Monuments.

133
134
135
136
137

Supra Section II.B.3.c.
United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 467 (1915).
Id. at 468–69.
Id. at 471.
Id. at 474 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
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D. The Property Clause Is Administrative, Not Legislative in Nature
The Property Clause power does not lend itself well to classification as a
purely legislative power. Congress, for example, has power “to dispose of”
the federal territory.138 Selling land to private parties can hardly be
characterized as legislative in nature if we conceive of legislation as generally
regulating private conduct. To be sure, Congress also has power under the
Clause to make “all needful rules and regulations” for the territories. 139 But
this power, which previously belonged to the King, seeks to create specific
rules for specific places that are generally off-limits to human habitation. It
is administrative in nature, not legislative.
This distinction found expression in jurisprudence when courts were
called upon to rule in cases and controversies involving the public lands. As
congressional policies slowly changed from disposition to conservation and
preservation in the late nineteenth century, and as Congress began to
regulate the use of the public lands to a greater extent by enlisting the
executive, litigation regarding the nature and appropriate use of the Property
Clause became inevitable. The Court repeatedly characterized the Property
Clause as non-legislative in nature and refused to upset congressional or
presidential action exercised thereunder.
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
A. Past Judicial Deference Under the Antiquities Act
The cases reviewed in the last Part demonstrate a practice on the part of
the Court to (1) treat the congressional exercise of Property Clause power as
plenary and non-reviewable; and (2) treat the presidential exercise of
Property Clause power as essentially non-reviewable on the theory that nondelegation principles are not at play and it is therefore Congress’s job to
overturn presidential action.
With respect to the Antiquities Act in particular, the judiciary has always
adopted a deferential approach to presidential action for reasons that suggest
the courts believe Congress is the entity best-situated to remedy unlawful
acts. One is hard pressed to find a case where the Supreme Court struck
down congressional or presidential action performed pursuant to the
Property Clause, other than Dred Scott.140

138
139
140

U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
Id.
Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
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1. Grand Canyon National Monument141
Ralph Henry Cameron and his brother, Niles, asserted mining claims
along the South Rim of the Grand Canyon in the early 1900s.142 Their
claims were located along the main trail from the South Rim to the Canyon
Floor—the Bright Angel trail. 143 This allowed them, they thought, to charge
access fees to anyone wishing to use the trail. 144 After Theodore Roosevelt
proclaimed the entirety of the Grand Canyon a National Monument, the
Secretary of the Interior sought to dislodge the Cameron brothers from the
area, alleging that their claims lacked sufficient minerals to justify perfection
of the claim.145 The Camerons’ case wound up in the Supreme Court where
they argued, among other things, that President Roosevelt lacked authority
to declare the entire Grand Canyon a National Monument.146 The Court
gave short shrift to this argument. The Court was not willing to second guess
the President’s determination of the size of the area necessary for protection
of the object of scientific interest.147
2. Jackson Hole National Monument
Congress created Grand Teton National Park in 1929. At the time of
the creation of the Park, John D. Rockefeller owned 33,000 acres of the
Jackson Hole Valley adjacent to the Park through his Snake River Land
Company. His goal was to hold that acreage in effective trust for the federal
government until such time as it could be added to the Park. However, local
residents learned of the semi-secret plan and opposed it. The National Park
Service could not convince Congress to add Rockefeller’s land to the Park
over the objections of the Wyoming delegation. By the 1940s, Rockefeller
was ready to divest himself of his property in Wyoming if it could not be
protected land, and he announced his intentions to the Secretary of the
Interior. Franklin Roosevelt decided to circumvent Congress, and declared
a new national monument—the Grand Teton National Monument in 1943.
He did so with Rockefeller’s donated land as well as some land already
managed by the U.S. Forest Service.148
141

142
143
144
145
146
147
148

See Cameron v. United States, 252 U.S. 450 (1920) (holding that the monument reserve of the
Grand Canyon was proper); see also Squillace, supra note 95, at 490–507 (describing the role of the
Antiquities Act of 1906 in the creation of the Grand Canyon as a national monument).
Cameron, 252 U.S. at 454.
Id. at 455 & n.1.
Id. at 458.
Id. at 455.
Id.
Id. at 464.
This history is recounted in Hal Rothman, A Showdown at Jackson Hole: A Monumental Backlash against
the Antiquities Act, in THE ANTIQUITIES ACT: A CENTURY OF AMERICAN ARCHAEOLOGY,
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In the middle of World War II, Wyoming Senator Edward Robertson
called the designation a “foul, sneaking Pearl Harbor blow.”149 Other
congressional delegates and local newspapers also denounced the decision.
Hollywood actor Wallace Beery led 550 sheep and their shepherds into the
monument for the summer to protest. Wyoming filed a lawsuit against the
National Park Service in a federal district court, claiming that the Monument
designation violated the Antiquities Act.150 The district court judge
characterized the dispute as a political controversy, and declined to rule.
According to the court, “the burden [was] on Congress to pass such remedial
legislation as may obviate any injustice.”151 The court’s dismissal of the case
meant the Monument remained.
3. National Monuments in Alaska
Alaska is roughly 600,000 square miles—or about 370 million acres—
more than twice the size of Texas. When Congress created the State of
Alaska, it transferred 105 million acres to state control, leaving three-quarters
of the new state in federal control. However, the question of control and
management of these public lands was not clear at statehood due to the
claims of Alaskan Natives, the discovery of oil on the North Shore, and the
growing preservation movement. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, state
leaders, federal officials, and tribal leaders all negotiated for control and
management of the land.152 In the midst of ongoing negotiations and the
debating of proposed legislation, President Carter announced on December
1, 1978 new National Monuments in Alaska totaling fifty-six million acres,
to be managed partly by the U.S. Forest Service and partly by the U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service.153 This remains the largest creation of National
Monuments through a single proclamation. Carter felt compelled to act
based on the very slow-moving legislative process and pressure from
conservation activists.154
In the only case to challenge President Carter’s Monument designations
in Alaska, the federal district court held that there was a long-established
history of congressional acquiescence to the broad exercise of presidential

149
150
151
152

153
154

HISTORIC PRESERVATION, AND NATURE CONSERVATION, 81–83 (David Harmon, Francis P.
McManamon & Dwight T. Pitcaithley, eds. 2006).
Id.
Wyoming v. Frank, 58 F. Supp. 890 (D. Wyo. 1945).
Id. at 896.
See Cecil D. Andrus & John C. Freemuth, President Carter’s Coup: An Insider’s View of the 1978 Alaska
Monument Designations, in THE ANTIQUITIES ACT, supra note 148, at 93 (highlighting the prevalence
of land claims left unresolved by Alaska’s statehood act).
See Proclamation Nos. 4611–27, 43 Fed. Reg. 57,009–131 (Dec. 1, 1978).
See Andrus & Freemuth, supra note 152, at 93.
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authority.155 The court refused to disturb the Monument.156 In the two
aforementioned cases in Wyoming and Alaska, the courts effectively invited
Congress to respond to the alleged presidential abuses of discretion, which is
exactly what Congress did, as discussed in Part V.
4. Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument
The primary case challenging President Clinton’s designation of the
Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument is discussed more fully in
Part IV. As will be seen, the court there showed extreme deference to both
the President and Congress in the exercise of property management power,
granting only the most minimal judicial review.
B. Past Congressional Acquiescence to Monument Reduction
Many times in the past, Presidents have adjusted the size of monuments
both to enlarge them and to reduce them. Congress has yet to overrule a
reduction.
1. Navajo National Monument
President William Howard Taft, upon taking office in 1909, set about to
continue the conservation legacy of his then-close friend Theodore
Roosevelt. Two weeks into his presidency, he created the Navajo National
Monument within the boundaries of the Navajo Indian Reservation to
protect “a number of prehistoric cliff dwellings and pueblo ruins.”157 Three
years later, Taft issued a second proclamation stating that “after careful
examination and survey . . . [the Navajo National Monument] has been
found to reserve a much larger tract of land than is necessary for the
protection of such of the ruins . . . and therefore the same should be reduced
in area.”158 The original Monument was 360 acres. The elimination of 320
acres reduced its size by eighty-nine percent. If we view the purpose of the
Antiquities Act as allowing the President to act swiftly to prevent the raiding
of archeological sites, we should not be surprised to find an initial
overprotection of the sites based on limited knowledge of the area, followed
by a reduction in the monument based upon a more thorough examination.
Congress did not stop Taft from reducing the size of the Monument.

155
156
157
158

Anaconda Copper Co. v. Andrus, No. A79-161, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17861, at *5–6 (D. Alaska
July 1, 1980)
Id.
Proclamation No. 873 (Mar. 20, 1909), available at https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/277580.
Proclamation No. 1186 (Mar. 14, 1912), available at https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/277569.
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2. Mount Olympus, Santa Rosa Island, Glacier Bay, and Great Sand Dunes
National Monuments
Taft may have reduced his own proclaimed Monument, but subsequent
presidents did not hesitate to reduce monuments proclaimed by
predecessors. In 1915, Woodrow Wilson cut the Mount Olympus National
Monument, proclaimed by Theodore Roosevelt, in half.159 In doing so he
specifically cited the discretion given to him in the Antiquities Act.160 Harry
Truman reduced by almost half the size of the Santa Rosa Island National
Monument that had been created by his predecessor in office.161 President
Eisenhower diminished at least two National Monuments—the Glacier Bay
National Monument created by Calvin Coolidge162 and the Great Sand
Dunes National Monument created by Herbert Hoover.163
In all of these instances, Congress chose not to intervene. If Congress
had intended to hand the President a one-way ratchet as Squillace and others
contend, it has failed to intervene to correct the President’s improper use of
the Antiquities Act. Congressional silence on these issues stands in marked
contrast to congressional action taken in response to perceived abuses of the
Antiquities Act, discussed in the next Section.
The courts have taken note of congressional acquiescence in the exercise
of presidential discretion regarding public lands management. As previously
mentioned, in United States v Midwest Oil Co., the Court faced the question of
whether Taft’s removal of federal land for purposes of preserving its oil was
constitutional in the absence of a specific statute.164 The Court noted that
although land management was generally a congressional affair, Congress
could delegate by implication some of its proprietor powers to the President.
And how did this implied delegation work? By failure to object to the “long
continued practice” of presidential withdrawals.165 In short, Congress
acquiesced to the President’s exercise of power.166 This is not to say Congress
is incapable of taking action. To the contrary, Congress has many times
demonstrated its ability to reign in the President. These actions are discussed
in the next Section.
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See Clifford Edwin Roloff, The Mount Olympus National Monument, 25 WASH. HIST. Q. 214, 227
(1934).
Antiquities Act of 1906, 54 U.S.C. §§ 320301–03 (2012).
Proclamation No. 2659, 10 Fed. Reg. 10,275 (Aug. 13, 1945).
Proclamation No. 3089, 20 Fed. Reg. 2103 (Mar. 31, 1955).
Proclamation No. 3138, 21 Fed. Reg. 4035 (June 7, 1956).
236 U.S. 459, 460 (1915). The facts of the case occurred prior to passage of the Pickett Act in 1910.
Id. at 483.
Id. at 471.
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C. Past Congressional Remedial Action
1. Amendments to the Forest Service Act
Although the President had the authority to declare Forest Reserves in
the early part of the 1890s, he lacked real enforcement and management
mechanisms. Ranchers continued to graze their livestock on reserved land
and miners continued to mine. Congress created a Forest Commission in
1896, modeled on prior Land Commissions, to study the issue and make
recommendations for improving forest management.167 Entering the scene
that decade as a member of the commission was a strong advocate for a
progressive-based theory of forest management—Gifford Pinchot.168
Following his graduation from Yale in 1889, which education included
his induction into the Skull and Bones Society from which he would later
hire many managers in the U.S. Forest Service, Pinchot studied forestry in
Europe.169 To do so, he turned down an offer to work in the Department of
the Interior. Upon his return to the United States a few months later,
Pinchot was considered a national authority on forest management. Once
again, though, Pinchot turned down employment with government in order
to manage a private forest in North Carolina owned by the Vanderbilt
family. Pinchot’s hope was to parlay successful management of a private
forest based on European techniques into political capital that could be used
to assert forest management on a grand, national scale. Although the
Vanderbilt forest was a success on paper only, Pinchot nevertheless enhanced
his status as an expert in forest management.170 Pinchot was named as one
of the Forest Service Commissioners in 1896 and his big personality would

167
168

169

170

See Gerald W. Williams & Char Miller, At the Creation: The National Forest Commission of 1896–97,
FOREST HIST. TODAY, Spring/Fall 2005, at 32.
Gifford Pinchot was born in 1865 with a silver spoon in his mouth. Both of his grandfathers were
wealthy landowners—one in Pennsylvania and one in Manhattan. His maternal grandfather,
Amos Eno, was at one point the richest man in New York City. Pinchot grew up in New York and
traveled extensively through Europe during his adolescence. Traditional professions for someone
like Pinchot, in medicine, law, or the ministry, did not interest him. Pinchot preferred the outdoors.
“I loved the woods and everything about them,” he later recalled. Instead of adapting to an indoor
profession, Pinchot decided to professionalize the outdoors. Pinchot’s father, James, had been
introduced to forest management during travels in Europe and encouraged his son to consider
forestry as a profession, and idea Pinchot found very appealing. Such a profession did not exist in
the United States and, Brian Balogh writes, Pinchot “literally had to create” it. Brian Balough,
Scientific Forestry and the Roots of the Modern American State: Gifford Pinchot’s Path to Progressive Reform, 7
ENVTL. HIST. 198, 203 (2002).
In Europe, Pinchot met Dietrich Brandis, a German academic who managed the British forest
system in Burma. Brandis advised Pinchot to remain in Europe longer to become a master of his
profession. Pinchot ignored his advice and returned home accurately anticipating that he would
be considered the highest authority of forestry in the United States. Id. at 208.
Id. at 199–200.

Feb. 2019]

THE HYBRID NATURE OF THE PROPERTY CLAUSE

799

dominate forest management for decades.
Most members of the Forest Service Commission toured the West in
1896 and were joined by John Muir, who advocated a vast expansion of
Forest Reserves. The members of the Commission also recommended the
creation of an enforcement arm―to prevent unauthorized grazing and
timber extraction in reserves. They only disagreed upon the appropriate
composition of forest enforcement. The chair of the committee wanted the
military in charge, whereas Pinchot argued for a scientifically–trained
civilian corps. Upon its return to Washington, the Commission made their
recommendations to the President and Congress.171
On February 22, 1897 (George Washington’s birthday), just before
leaving office, President Grover Cleveland proclaimed twenty-one million
acres of new forest reserves, increasing the acreage by more than 150%.172
The “Washington Birthday Reserves” created a furor in the West,
particularly among livestock interests, who called upon the newly-elected
McKinley to cancel the reserves.173 Gerald Williams and Char Miller write
that Cleveland’s Proclamation brought a central question to the fore in
American politics―“Who controlled the West?”174 The American Forestry
Association summarized the complaints of western interests as:
(a) Unnatural irritation at the idea that Eastern influences are presuming to
assert themselves in regard to the Western states.
(b) Natural irritation at the manner in which the reservations were made,
without consultation with Western Representatives.
(c) Reasonable objection to the inclusion of agricultural lands within the
bounds of the reservation.
(d) Unreasonable objection to the whole forest reservation idea as impeding
licentious use of the public domain by everybody.175

Without waiting for McKinley’s inauguration, western state
congressional delegates attached a rider to the Sundry Appropriations Act
for 1898 that would eliminate all of the Forest Reserves.176 Cleveland pocket
vetoed the legislation on his last day of office.177 The government would run
out of money on July 1 of that year without further action by Congress and
incoming President McKinley. In his first week in office, McKinley called
Congress into an extra session and urged its members to provide “sufficient
revenue to faithfully administer the Government” before other business was

171
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174
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See Williams & Miller, supra note 167, at 32–41.
Id. at 37.
Id.
Id. at 39.
Id. at 38–39.
Bassman, supra note 25, at 509–11.
Id.
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transacted.178 McKinley did not heed the call to simply cancel Cleveland’s
designations. Rather, he worked to ensure passage of compromise legislation
in the spring of 1897.
Although Cleveland’s designations were unpopular in the West, they
were popular in the East. Eastern progressives desired a robust Forest
Reserve system, complete with enforcement power. Both sides of the debate
used appropriations legislation in 1897 to wrangle some concessions.
Therefore, much of the Forest Service Organic Act of 1897 (which was part
of the general appropriations bill) was a response to the concerns of the
western states that the President had too much power to remove from the
public domain commercially important lands. Western state leaders were
angry over (1) the creation of thirteen western reserves by President
Cleveland and (2) the recommendations of the Forest Commission, which
suggested the creation of many more reserves in western states. “A storm of
protest arose in the West, expressed in public meetings, memorials from
legislatures, by letters from western public officials, angry editorials and
vituperative denunciation of the President in both houses of Congress
. . . .”179
In order, then, to establish the Forest Service, the Organic Act needed
to be a bill of compromise. In exchange for the creation of the Forest Service,
the Organic Act made three concessions to western states. First, the Organic
Act limited the President’s discretion to create forest reserves by stating that:
“No public forest reservation shall be established except to improve and
protect the forest within the reservation . . . it is not the purpose or intent of
these provisions . . . to authorize the inclusion . . . of lands more valuable for
the mineral therein, or for agricultural purposes, than for forest purposes.”180
Congress thus curtailed the President’s wide-ranging discretion under the
Forest Reserve Act. Second, Congress suspended Cleveland’s designations
for a period of nine months. This would give President McKinley time to
review and decide upon the fate of those reserves pursuant to the third and
perhaps most important concession of the bill—Congress specifically
authorized the President to revoke previous designations:
[T]o remove any doubt which may exist pertaining to the authority of the
President thereunto, the President of the United States is hereby authorized
and empowered to revoke, modify, or suspend any and all such Executive
orders and proclamations, or any part thereof, from time to time as he shall
deem best for the public interests . . . .181
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President
William
McKinley,
Message
to
Congress
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=69239.
See Bassman, supra note 25, at 509.
Organic Act of 1897, ch. 2., 30 Stat. 11, 34.
Id. at 34.

(March

15,
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The man who introduced the amendment that granted the President a
rescission power was Representative Oscar Underwood, from Alabama.
Underwood thought the Office of the President was better suited than
Congress to make determinations about which Forest Reserve areas should
be reduced or rescinded. “I think that the Executive of this nation is in a
much better position to exercise his judgment as to what portions of this
reserve should be established and what portions should not be than we are,
who do not have the full facts before us.”182 Representative William Ellis of
Oregon stated that the amendment was necessary not because any member
of Congress doubted the President’s ability to revoke a prior order, but
because McKinley himself felt some “timidity” about undoing the work of
his predecessor.183 Indeed, the impatient Representative Freeman Knowles
of South Dakota argued that he and like-minded colleagues had been trying
for months already to get McKinley to agree to revoke Cleveland’s orders,
to no avail. “The President has power to revoke it. There is no question
about that at all.”184 This exchange during the floor debate suggests that the
prefatory language of the amendment “to remove any doubt” was inserted
to remove any doubt in McKinley’s own mind about his power to revoke,
rather than any doubt in the minds of the members of Congress. McKinley
signed the bill.185
The question that occupies the legal field of Public Lands Management
in 2018 is the same question that occupied Congress 120 years ago as it
debated the Forest Service Act: Does the President have the authority to
revoke a previous presidential proclamation withdrawing lands from the
public domain? In both cases the proclamation power was not a
constitutional prerogative power, but rather a delegated power from
Congress. And in both cases the initial delegation of power was silent on the
question of rescission. Arguments both for and against this rescission power

182
183
184
185

30 CONG. REC. 1006 (1897) (statement of Rep. Oscar Underwood).
Id. at 1007 (statement of Rep. William Ellis).
Id. (statement of Rep. Freeman Knowles).
Despite the nine-month suspension, McKinley did not rescind Cleveland’s designations. BrooksNicolopoulos, supra note 90, at 36–37. Indeed, McKinley continued to designate new forest reserves
throughout his administration, only invoking the rescission power one time to return a portion of
the Olympic Forest Reserve in Washington to the public domain in 1900. Id. Western states saw
a growth of forest reserves in the region during the administration of McKinley, and an even larger
expansion during the administration of Theodore Roosevelt. Roosevelt’s aggressive use of the
power, at the urging of Gifford Pinchot, proved so unpopular that Congress repealed the power in
1907. Id. Roosevelt, recognizing the political realities, reluctantly signed the repeal bill, but not
before creating sixteen million new acres of reserves the day before. Id. Pinchot, for his part,
engaged in an eight-year long campaign between 1897 and 1905 to transfer management of the
nation’s forests from the Department of the Interior to the Department of Agriculture, where the
Forest Service was housed, so that he might have free hand in their management. Id. Pinchot also
decided that “National Forest” was a better name than “Forest Reserve.” Id.
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with respect to National Monuments were reviewed briefly in the
Introduction. How did Congress answer that question in 1897?
Congress decided to grant the President an explicit rescission power.
This has led some scholars to claim the President cannot reduce the size of
monuments because the Antiquities Act contains no such provision.186
However, the legislative history and the prefatory language tells a different
story. “To remove any doubt” suggests the possibility that an explicit
authorization from Congress was not actually necessary, but was inserted to
avoid further debate and expedite the process of rescinding previous orders,
for which westerners were extremely anxious. Further, those most strongly
advocating in favor of an express delegation, as the history reveals, thought
the President already had an inherent power. To use the language in this
context suggests that the President had an inherent rescission power already,
and that the statute merely underscores his pre-existing power. Similarly,
the Supreme Court has referred to the Tenth Amendment as a “truism,”
merely stating explicitly what is already implied in the structure of the
Constitution.187 One could imagine prefatory language to the Tenth
Amendment reading, “To remove any doubt, the powers not delegated
. . . .” Interestingly, the prefatory language “to remove any doubt” did not
find its way into the United States Code, despite its relevance to the current
question. Such editing of the Statutes at Large is a good reminder that the
United States Code is not the law, but merely a reflection of the law.188
Is this history of the Forest Service Act dispositive of the issue today
involving National Monuments? Of course not. And that is the point.
Scholars and attorneys today who argue that the Forest Service Act
demonstrates the absence of an inherent rescission power have not paid close
enough attention to the historical context of the Act. Congress limited this
revocation power to proclamations made under the Forest Reserve Act of
1891. The statute, therefore, is not legally applicable to the designation of
National Monuments under the subsequently passed Antiquities Act of 1906
or to any other presidential proclamations or orders. And there is no reason
why a court today is bound by a congressional interpretation from 120 years
ago. However, if the statute of 1897 is, as Congress thought, a “truism” in
that it merely confirms the President already holds a power of revocation
with respect to previous presidential orders, then he would also hold that
same revocation power with respect to presidential proclamations made
under the Antiquities Act.
186
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See Squillace, Biber, Bryner & Hecht, supra note 18, at 56 (“Congress did not, in the Antiquities Act
or otherwise, delegate to the President the authority to modify or revoke the designation of
monuments.”).
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
See Tobias A. Dorsey, Some Reflections on Not Reading the Statutes, 10 GREEN BAG 2D 283, 284 (2007)
(describing the Code as a guide to reading the law as opposed to the law itself).
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2. Amendments to the Antiquities Act
a. Wyoming
Returning to the story of Jackson Hole, the federal government still
wanted to make Grand Teton National Monument part of the Grand Teton
National Park and continued to work toward that end, even after the court
refused to upset the Monument.189 The creation of a National Park goes
through Congress. In order to win approval for the expanded National Park
from western delegates, members of Congress agreed to a compromise. In
the legislation creating the Park, it agreed to abolish the Antiquities Act with
respect to Wyoming only.190 For this reason, the Antiquities Act to this day
has no application in Wyoming. The President is not allowed to name any
more Monuments in Wyoming. In the face of controversial presidential
action, Congress demonstrated its ability to rein in the President.
b. Alaska
Following Jimmy Carter’s proclamation creating monuments in Alaska,
there was a large outcry and protest of his actions in the West, as anticipated.
He was burned in effigy in Alaska and, as with the creation of Grand Teton
National Monument, protestors stormed onto the land and conducted
prohibited activities in defiance of federal regulations.191
Carter’s
designations spurred Congress into action. It finally passed the Alaska
National Interest Lands Conservation Act (“ANILCA”) to resolve multiple
outstanding public lands issues. Among other things, it modified some of
Carter’s monument designations and allowed for various resource extraction
activities in others. It also modified the Antiquities Act such that any new
monument designations in Alaska in excess of 5,000 acres must be listed in
the Federal Register and must be approved by Congress within one year of the
date of designation.192 President Carter signed the bill into law just before
leaving office. Alaska thus joined Wyoming as the second of only two states
with special exemptions from the Antiquities Act. Whereas Presidents have
no power to act in Wyoming pursuant to the Antiquities Act, they may
declare new monuments in Alaska subject to congressional approval.
Congress once again proved its ability to reign in runaway presidential
action.193
189
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Wyoming v. Frank, 58 F. Supp. 890 (D. Wyo. 1945).
64 Stat. 849, 853 (1950).
See Egan, supra note 5.
Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 96-478, § 1326, 94 Stat. 2371, 2488
(codified at 16 U.S.C. § 3213 (1980)).
In this discussion of Congressional remedial action, I have not undertaken to discuss the
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IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF PRESIDENT TRUMP’S MONUMENT
REDUCTION
Having reviewed this history of judicial deference to both Congress and
the Executive, as well as congressional action and acquiescence, we now may
turn to the question of what type of judicial review is available for the
challenges that have been made to President Trump’s reduction to Bears
Ears and Grand Staircase Escalante. The following are four possible avenues
for judicial review of President Trump’s actions. The first two avenues are
barred to plaintiffs in the present case. The second two avenues, though
allowing for judicial review, still demand judicial deference be made—not
strictly to the President, but to Congress.
A. No Review Under the Administrative Procedure Act
The lawsuits filed against Trump assert claims under the Administrative
Procedure Act (“APA”).194 The APA creates statutory judicial review of
agency action. The law allows a person suffering legal wrong due to the
actions of an agency to seek relief against the United States. 195 However, the
Supreme Court has held that this statutory avenue for relief is not available
for presidential actions. In Franklin v. Massachusetts, the Court stated, “the
President is not an agency within the meaning of the [APA].”196
Perhaps, one might argue, because Trump based his decision on the
recommendation of an agency that would fall under the APA’s provisions-the Department of the Interior—then his actions are reviewable thereunder.
This argument was foreclosed in Franklin and rejected in a district court case
even more directly on point Utah Ass’n of Counties v. Bush.197 There, a group
of counties and other interested parties filed a lawsuit seeking to undo
President Clinton’s creation of the Grand Staircase-Escalante National
Monument. The court, applying Franklin, held that “the fact that presidential
action is required before there will be any effect eliminates the prospect of
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comprehensive land management reform Congress enacted in 1976—the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act (“FLPMA”). In this Act, Congress formally terminated old disposal policies,
ended presidential discretion for most withdrawals (except the Antiquities Act), and placed formal
rules on the Department of Interior and other land-management governing bodies. Pub. L. No.
94-579, 90 Stat. 2743, 2789–92 (1976). For a discussion of FLPMA interaction with the Antiquities
Act, see Elena Daly & Geoffrey B. Middaugh, The Antiquities Act Meets the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act, in THE ANTIQUITIES ACT, supra note 148, at 219.
See, e.g., Complaint for Injunctive & Declaratory Relief at ¶12, Hopi Tribe v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv02590 (D.D.C. Dec. 4, 2017).
5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012).
505 U.S. 788, 796 (1992).
316 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1189 (D. Utah 2004).
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judicial review under the APA.”198 To be certain, plaintiffs in the current
litigation argue that there are other avenues for judicial review against the
President—these will be addressed shortly. But Franklin and Utah Ass’n of
Counties, if they are to be followed, demand dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims made
pursuant to the APA.199
B. No Review for Abuse of Discretion
The plaintiffs in the current litigation against President Trump do not
allege an abuse of discretion. Rather, they assert he had no discretion
whatsoever to reduce the monuments. These claims are considered in the
next two sections. Nevertheless, if the Court were to treat the Antiquities Act
as having given the President not only the discretion to create monuments
initially, but also the discretion to reduce their size ex-post facto, then the
Court must also defer to that discretion. The Supreme Court has said that
“[w]henever a statute gives a discretionary power to any person, to be
exercised by him upon his own opinion of certain facts, it is a sound rule of
construction, that the statute constitutes him the sole and exclusive judge of
the existence of those facts.”200 Further, where a claim “concerns not a want
of [presidential] power, but a mere excess or abuse of discretion in exerting
a power given, it is clear that it involves considerations which are beyond the
reach of judicial power.”201
C. Limited Non-Statutory Ultra Vires Review
Those suing Trump allege that he acted ultra vires—outside the scope of
the Antiquities Act. Squillace, Biber, Bryner, and Hecht agree with this,
arguing that the Act grants the President only the power to create new
monuments, but not power to reduce the size of existing ones.202
This alleged ultra vires act of the President, they say, allows for judicial
review even in the absence of a statutory grant. Presidents may lawfully act
in only two circumstances: (1) with constitutional authority or (2) with
delegated authority from Congress. However, non-statutory review of
presidential ultra vires acts is not guaranteed under current case law. As
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Id (footnote omitted).
The Tribes are on stronger statutory jurisdictional ground than other parties. This is because they
may turn to a separate statute that provides U.S. district courts with original jurisdiction to hear
“all civil actions, brought by any Indian tribe . . . wherein the matter in controversy arises under
the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1362 (2012).
United States v. George S. Bush & Co., Inc., 310 U.S. 371, 380 (1940) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
Dakota Cent. Tel. Co. v. South Dakota ex rel. Payne, 250 U.S. 163, 184 (1919).
See Squillace, Biber, Bryner & Hecht, supra note 18.
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Kevin Stack writes, there is a long line of decisions in which the Supreme
Court has declined to review whether the President properly used his
statutory powers.203 Even in cases where the Court engages in a nominal
non-statutory review, it has limited its inquiry to determining whether the
President has merely invoked its statutory authority. For example, in Utah
Ass’n of Counties, the court acknowledged the existence of non-statutory
review. “Although judicial review is not available to assess a particular
exercise of presidential discretion, a Court may ensure that a president was
in fact exercising the authority conferred by the act at issue.”204 However,
the court then severely curtailed its own non-statutory review by stating that
“[c]learly established Supreme Court precedent instructs that the Court’s
judicial review in these circumstances is at best limited to ascertaining that
the President in fact invoked his powers under the Antiquities Act. Beyond
such a facial review the Court is not permitted to go.”205
Turning briefly to the substance of the argument: Squillace, Biber,
Bryner, and Hecht argue for a one-way ratchet interpretation of the
Antiquities Act.206 That is, the President may create National Monuments
with unlimited discretion and even enlarge the borders of existing ones, but
the President may never reduce their size because such a rescission power is
not included in the language of the statute. This argument is one that might
make strict textualists proud—it requires a reading of the words “The
President . . . may reserve . . . parcels of land, the limits of which . . . shall be
confined to the smallest area compatible with proper care and management
of the objects to be protected” to absolutely preclude a reduction to
monuments, despite the historic use of the Antiquities Act to do just that,
with congressional acquiescence, if not express approval.207
Presumably, then, Squillace, Biber, Bryner, and Hecht believe that the
absence of this language in the Antiquities Act would preclude a President
from reducing the size of a monument that he himself created. That is, if
President Obama, one week after creating Bears Ears, announced a
reduction to Bears Ears based on a confessed abuse of discretion, the courts
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Kevin Stack, The Reviewability of the President’s Statutory Powers, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1171, 1172, 1175
(2009). Professor Stack argues that courts ought to review presidential acts, even absent statutory
judicial review, to determine whether the President acted ultra vires.
Utah Ass’n of Ctys. v. Bush, 316 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1186 (D. Utah 2004).
Id. at 1183.
The argument that the Antiquities Act gives the President a “one-way lever” is also made by Jayni
Foley Hein. See Jayni Foley Hein, Monumental Decisions: One-Way Levers Towards Preservation in the
Antiquities Act and Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 48 ENVTL. L. 125, 161 (2018) (“Both the Antiquities
Act and OCSLA section 12(a) provide one-way levers for the President to protect special places for
the benefit of present and future generations. Congress did not give the President the power to
undo or diminish these reservations of public land.”).
Antiquities Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-209, § 2, 34 Stat. 225, 225 (1906).
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must disallow the reduction as violative of the statute. If Squillace, Biber,
Bryner, and Hecht, however, believe that the prohibition on reduction
applies only to successor presidents, they have not explained how they tease
that caveat out of the plain language of the statute. If a President is allowed
to correct his own abuse of discretion, why may a President not correct the
abuse of discretion of a predecessor in office?
Further, if Congress intended for the Antiquities Act to be a one-way
ratchet, it could have inserted clear language to that effect, as it has done
with other delegations of power to the Executive Branch. For example, in
multiple delegations of environmental regulation to the President, Congress
has included anti-backsliding provisions, which at least one court has referred
to as “one-way ratchet[s].”208 The Clean Water Act says, “a permit may not
be renewed . . . to contain . . . limitations which are less stringent than the
comparable . . . limitations in the previous permit . . . ..”209 Likewise, the
Clean Air Act contains an anti-backsliding provision that prevents the
relaxation of air quality standards.210 If Congress wants to create a specific
anti-backsliding provision for the Antiquities Act, it knows how to do so.
Thus far, Congress has chosen not to include one. The courts should not
read one into the statute where there is an absence of express language.
There is good reason for the Court to take a deferential approach in this
situation. Everyone agrees that Congress has the authority to step in and
remedy what Trump has done. Everyone also agrees that Congress has the
authority to amend the Antiquities Act to clarify whether it is a one-way
ratchet or not. If the Court would attempt to resolve the statutory ambiguity,
it would be trying to do the job of Congress. As discussed more fully in
Part V, Congress is the branch of government with the most institutional
competency to remedy presidential action taken pursuant to delegated
Property Clause powers.
D. Limited Review for Constitutional Violation
A claim that the President acted ultra vires, in order to succeed, must be
coupled with a claim that he lacks independent constitutional authority to so
act. Squillace, Biber, Bryner, and Hecht, and the claimants in the litigation
against Trump, claim that the President has misappropriated a Property
Clause power from Congress—the power to adjust the boundaries of
National Monuments.
Even if it is true that the President has
misappropriated the Property Clause, the Court should adopt a modest and
deferential attitude in its judicial review for two reasons.
208
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Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 643 F.3d 311, 322 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
33 U.S.C. § 1342(o)(1) (2012); see also 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(4) (providing a similar anti-backsliding
provision).
42 U.S.C. § 7502(e) (2012).
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First, as with the ultra vires claim, congressional intent regarding the
degree to which it wishes the President involved in these decisions is not clear.
The language of the Antiquities Act does not clearly indicate congressional
intent to prevent the President from reducing monuments. This ambiguity,
coupled with a history of congressional acquiescence to reduction decisions,
suggest that perhaps Congress wants the President to be able to reduce
monuments at his discretion. Congress certainly has the power to stop him.
The Court should let Congress correct the President if Congress feels the
President is out of bounds. After all, it is a congressional administrative
authority at issue, not a judicial one. Let Congress guard its own
authority―it does not need help from the Court.
Second, the hybrid nature of the Property Clause means that ordinary
separation of powers concerns are not at play. Underlying the nondelegation doctrine and the separation of powers doctrine is the idea that
only the legislative branch should exercise legislative powers and only the
executive branch should exercise executive powers. When the executive
branch exercises legislative powers, we are justifiably concerned that too
much power is housed in one branch. The Property Clause, as many court
decisions have articulated, is not strictly a legislative power. It is an
administrative one—one that was naturally exercised by the executive of
Great Britain. It is qualitatively different than the powers housed in
Article I—enumerated powers Congress has to regulate private conduct.
When the President manages property pursuant to the invitation of
Congress, an ordinary separation of powers analysis is not warranted. While
it is certainly possible for the President to exceed both his constitutional and
statutory authority, the entity best positioned to remedy his acts is Congress.
V. THE INSTITUTION BEST-SITUATED TO REMEDY TRUMP’S ACTION IS
CONGRESS
President Trump’s Proclamation shrinking the size of the Bears Ears and
the Grand Staircase-Escalante Monuments has raised new concerns about
unilateral executive action. The Patagonia Company, which has filed a
lawsuit against the President, asserts “The President Stole Your Land.”211
Other groups opposed to President Trump’s actions similarly claim that he
acted illegally.
Antiquities Act controversies are, at their heart, procedural. Trump’s
actions have stirred a re-awakening and attraction to the stability and
permanence of legislative solutions to difficult land management decisions,
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Joseph Hincks, ‘The President Stole Your Land.’ Patagonia to Sue Trump Over Rollback of National Monuments,
FORTUNE (Dec. 5, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/12/05/patagonia-lawsuit-utah-monumentstrump/.
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rather than executive fiat. John Echohawk is the Executive Director of the
Native American Rights Fund, which is opposed to President Trump’s
Proclamation. The Fund plans to finance litigation that seeks to nullify
Trump’s actions. Echohawk writes that a “true government-to-government”
process for setting the boundaries of National Monuments in which Native
Americans have an interest entails “member[s] of Congress approach[ing]
the tribes, and in open and transparent dialogue . . . discuss[ing] shared
priorities and interests.”212 Echohawk lauds the legislative process for setting
the boundaries of Bears Ears, including efforts by Representative Reuben
Gallego of Arizona, who would establish the boundaries through a
congressional process.213
Echohawk’s sentiments about the legislative process are not unlike those
who opposed the creation of Bears Ears in the first place. They, too, would
prefer that monuments, if they are to be created, be created legislatively.214
Although these opposing parties disagree on the size and even existence of
the monuments, they both find unilateral executive action distasteful. The
controversies are generated not from substance, but from the process. For
in the creation of monuments, Congress has forgone bicameralism and
presentment, which necessitate dialogue and compromise, and replaced
them with a delegation of a seemingly monarchical authority to the
President. This was the system of Great Britain that the Framers found
distasteful.
Trump’s actions therefore present a unique opportunity for compromise
legislation. Modest proposals have been offered in the past twenty years,
although no action has been taken. James Rasband, for example, suggested
after President Clinton’s surprise announcement of the Grand StaircaseEscalante Monument, that Presidents be required to post notice and receive
comments for a designated period, similar to what is already required of the
Secretary of the Interior when changes to land use are under consideration
for Bureau of Land Management land.215 However, this was essentially the
process followed by President Obama in the creation of the Bears Ears
Monument. Although he was not legally required to do so, President
Obama’s intentions to create Bears Ears were not secret, and his Interior
Secretary Sally Jewel visited the area and received feedback.216 President
Obama’s openness about the process did little to dampen the controversy or
212
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John E. Echohawk, President Trump’s Bears Ears Order is an Illegal Attack on Tribal Sovereignty,
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/trump-bears
-ears-tribal-sovereignty_us_5a25b663e4b03c44072fcc02.
Id.
See Brian Maffly & Thomas Burr, Obama Declares Bear Ears National Monument in Southern Utah, SALT LAKE
TRIB. (Dec. 29, 2016, 1:31 PM), https://archive.sltrib.com/article.php?id=4675012&itype=CMSID.
James R. Rasband, Utah’s Grand Staircase: The Right Path to Wilderness Preservation?, 70 U. COLO. L.
REV. 483, 537 (1999).
See Maffly & Burr, supra note 214.
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to prevent Trump’s rescissions.
What are other options? Here, again, congressional history may be
useful to identify several courses of action. While many of them may not be
politically viable or otherwise good solutions, one precedent offers hope for
reasonable and wise congressional action.
A. Option A—The 1897 Forest Reserve Compromise
Congress could follow the example of the 1897 Congress and grant the
President an explicit rescission power to “remove any doubt” about his
power to rescind. Such an option is probably not viable in the current
political climate because such a large constituency is not inclined to grant the
President more power at this time, especially a rescission power.
B. Option B—The 1907 Repeal of Unilateral Authority
Congress could follow the example of the Congress of 1907 and repeal
the presidential power to designate monuments altogether. Again, such an
option is probably not politically viable in the current moment. Although
many western state representatives would likely support this move, they are
still a small minority. Should the Court uphold an inherent executive
rescission power, Congress may wish to revisit this option to avoid continuing
see-saw battles of designations followed by revocations followed by redesignations and so forth. Congress would, of course, need to convince the
President to sign away his own power, or override his veto.
C. Option C—The 1950 Antiquities Act Amendment
Given that the most controversial designations in the past twenty years
have been in Utah, Congress could follow the example of the 1950 Congress
and exempt only Utah from future designations (as it did with Wyoming), in
exchange for restoration of the original Bears Ears and Grand StaircaseEscalante Monuments. The moment for this legislative move has likely
passed. The time to have accomplished it would have been as President
Obama was contemplating his initial designation of the Bears Ears
Monument. However, given the uncertainty surrounding the presidential
rescission power and the difficulty of predicting how the courts will rule on
the issue, both sides may feel more inclined to this compromise if they each
feel they have a reasonable chance of losing in court.
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D. Option D—ANILCA
The best option in terms of both its political viability and its consistency
with the American form of limited executive power is to adopt a compromise
modeled upon the most recent amendment to the Antiquities Act—
ANILCA. ANILCA allows the President to designate monuments in Alaska
but, for those greater than 5,000 acres, the designation must be ratified by
Congress within one year. Congress should extend this idea to the entirety
of the nation, not just Alaska, and should make the rescission power subject
to the same congressional approval.
E. Draft Legislation
Those who defend the power delegated to the President in the
Antiquities Act argue that it is important to have a mechanism for swift
executive action to protect land and monuments that might be subject to
harm while Congress deliberates. The ANILCA compromise allows the
President to act quickly to protect fragile ecosystems and antiquities, but, by
placing an expiration fuse on presidential action, puts Congress in charge of
the final decision. The compromise legislation could be drafted using the
language of ANILCA Section 1326 to rein in both the presidential designation
power and rescission power. Such language might look like this:
No future executive branch action which withdraws land from the public
domain pursuant to the Antiquities Act or rescinds or modifies existing
National Monuments shall be effective until notice is provided in the Federal
Register and to both Houses of Congress. Such withdrawals, rescissions, and
modifications shall terminate unless Congress passes a joint resolution of
approval within two years after the notice has been submitted to Congress.

The reason for the change from the one-year fuse in ANILCA to a twoyear fuse would be to allow for an intervening congressional election to
ensure that voters have the chance to express their approval or disapproval
of executive action at the ballot box.
CONCLUSION
The heart of Antiquities Act controversies is not substantive, but
procedural. Virtually no one disagrees that some public lands are worth
preserving based upon their scenic beauty and for other reasons. The process
is the problem. Congress should fix the problem. It has the power to do so.
And because that plenary power resides in Congress, the judiciary should
continue to tread lightly in reviewing public lands decisions.
The main procedural defect of the Antiquities Act is the vast power
granted to the President to act unilaterally. Public Lands Management
history demonstrates that Congress is perfectly able and willing to offer
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protection to public lands. Restoring that power to Congress will ensure that
the public lands and the people who love them will not be subject to arbitrary
or unpredictable executive behavior.

